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THREE STEPS AND YOU'RE OUT: THE MISUSE OF
THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS IN
CHILD SSI DISABILITY DETERMINATIONSt
Frank S. Bloch*
The federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides cash benefits to
financially needy persons who are 65 years of age or older, blind, or disabled. It
also provides cash benefits to children with disabilities under the age of 18. This
Article examines three sets of regulatory efforts to implement special disability stan-
dards for children, based first on the original SSI legislation, then on a seminal
Supreme Court decision, and finally on amendments to the Social Security Act
overruling the Court's decision, and shows how the "sequential evaluation proc-
ess," which has been useful for adjudicating adult disability claims, has been a
counterproductive force in the child's SSI program. It then suggests how the Social
Security Administration might meet the program's goals more effectively by break-
ing with the sequential evaluation model and replacing it with a unique disability
determination process for children.
Take me out to the ball game,
Take me out with the crowd.
Buy me some peanuts and Crackerjack,
I don't care if I never get back,
Let me root, root, root for the home team,
If they don't win it's a shame.
For it's one, two, three strikes, you're out,
At the old ball game.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Social welfare in the United States has always been directed by
special need, coupled, in most instances, with a moral or practical
link to lack of "fault." This special needs focus is apparent in the
national system of "categorical" social benefit programs; most
beneficiaries fall into one of a distinct set of special-need
t © 2003 by Frank S. Bloch. All fights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. B.A. 1966, Brandeis University;
J.D. 1969, Columbia University; Ph.D. (politics) 1978, Brandeis University. I am grateful to
David Ettinger and Alex Hurder for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this
article. Emily Urban, of the Vanderbilt Law School library staff, and law students Brant
Brown, John Kirk, Sarah Williams, and Carolyn Seugling provided thorough and helpful
ro'search assistance.
** "Take me out to the ballgame," music by Albert Von Tilzer; lyrics by Jack Norworth.
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categories: the elderly, the blind and disabled, and children (or,
more commonly, children deprived of full parental support).' The
lack-of-fault element builds on these categorical groupings, with
added emphasis via a "deserving poor" rationale for most public
2assistance programs.
Children with disabilities make up a classic without-fault, special-
need group; it is not surprising, therefore, that social policy experts
and planners have paid a great deal of attention to the special
needs of these children and have supported substantial program-
ming to meet those needs.3 Except for cash benefits. The Social
1. With room for some variation in the definition of "elderly" and the inclusion of a
child's family in the children category, these three groups are the primary targets of the
three main federal cash benefit programs: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (2000), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1394 (2000), and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) (the post-1996
replacement for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)), Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. I,
110 Stat. 2105, 2184 (codified as amended at scattered provisions of 42 U.S.C.). Moreover,
since eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid is linked to a large degree to eligibility for bene-
fits under one of these programs, the same three groups are also the primary targets of the
two main federal medical benefit programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395b-7 (2000) (Medi-
care); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000) (Medicaid). There are, of course, exceptions; the
national food stamp program, for example, is not limited to these or other "categories" of
persons. Although many state and local "general relief" or "general assistance" programs
have not always applied a categorical approach, the current trend is otherwise. Compare
Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a
General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871, 967-83 (1995)
(discussing a "categorization imperative" found in modern general assistance programs),
with CynthiaJ. Reichard, Due Process in the Administration of General Assistance: Are Written Stan-
dards Protecting the Indigent?, 59 IND. L.J. 443, 443 (1984) (contrasting general assistance
programs with SSI and AFDC; "General assistance provides financial aid to people in need
who cannot qualify for categorical assistance or whose categorical assistance is especially
inadequate"). See generally CORI E. UCCELLO ET AL., STATE GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
(1996); Julia Henly & Sandra Danzinger, Confronting Welfare Stereotypes: Characteristics of Gen-
eral Assistance Recipients and Postassistance Employment, 20 Soc. WORK RES. 217 (1996).
2. The concept of "deserving poor"-distinguishing among poor persons to identify
those worthy of public assistance-has its roots in pre-colonial history and remains impor-
tant to contemporary welfare policy. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER & ELLEN J.
HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING POOR": A STUDY OF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (1971).
See also Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty
State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 125-38 (2002) (discussing the "moralistic di-
mension" of the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor).
3. Examples include: the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant program,
42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (2002), which provides funds to states for health services for low-
income mothers and children; the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment
Services program (EPSDT), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (4) (B), a component of Medicaid that
focuses on prevention and intervention for children with disabilities; and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1457 (2000), which provides spe-
cial education services. See generally Deborah Spitalnik, An Overview of Policy Issues in Access to
Care for Children with Disabilities, 19 PACE L. REv. 285 (1999); Alan J. Tomkins & Victoria
Weisz, Social Science, Law, and the Interest in a Family Environment for Children with Disabilities, 26
U. TOL. L. REV. 937 (1995).
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Security Act did not include any disability benefit programs-for
adults or for children-when first enacted in 1935. 4 It was not until
the 1950s that disability was added as a basis for eligibility for fed-
eral benefit programs: first in 1950 with the introduction of Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), a joint fed-
eral/state public assistance program that merged eventually with a
broader program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD),
and then in 1956, with the addition of disability benefits to the re-
titled Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) pro-
gram.5 However, both of those programs were aimed exclusively at
adults.6 It was only with the creation of the first fully federal public
assistance program in 1974-Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) 7 -that cash benefits were made available nationally to chil-
dren with disabilities.
4. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). The Committee on Economic Se-
curity, which made the recommendations that formed the basis of the Social Security Act,
recognized that disability insurance presented particularly important and difficult problems
for a national program for economic security; however, it decided to leave those problems
for the future. See EDMUND E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 189
(1962).
5. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 Stat. 477; So-
cial Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807, 815-24,
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 942, 952. Notwithstanding a great deal of debate over whether
disability should be treated as a public assistance program or a social insurance program,
Congress's reasons for adding at first only a public assistance program for the disabled were
never made clear. See generally, Jacobus ten Broek & Richard B. Wilson, Public Assistance and
Social Insurance--A Normative Evaluation, I UCLA L. REV. 237 (1954); Jacobus ten Broek &
Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966). See also Mat-
thew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 361, 393-433 (1996).
6. APTD and AABD operated under state rules; however, states were required to fol-
low federal guidelines in order to qualify for federal grants. The definition of disability
recommended by federal regulations was firmly directed at adult claimants. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.80 (1972) (recommending that states set the disability standard as a "permanent
physical or mental impairment, disease, or loss, or combination thereof, [that] substantially
precludes him from engaging in useful occupations within his competence, such as holding
a job"); 45 C.F.R. § 233.80 (2002) (same regulation, currently applicable to state grants sup-
plementing SSI). For cases applying such a standard to pre-SSI federal-state programs, see
Ryan v. Shea, 394 F.Supp. 894, 899 (D. Colo. 1974), and Boisvert v. Zeiller, 334 F. Supp. 403,
408 (D.N.H. 1971). OASDI's insured status requirement effectively precludes disability in-
surance eligibility for children and dependent children (whose wage earning parent has
died or has become elderly or disabled) who are entitled to benefits without regard to dis-
ability until they are at least 18 years old. Although there is an "adult child" disability benefit
program under OASDI, the term "child" in that program refers to the parent-child relation-
ship between the beneficiary and his or her insured parent as the "child" must be at least 18
years old. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (2000). The federalization of benefits for the elderly,
blind, and disabled and the creation of the SSI program are discussed infra at text accompa-
nying notes 14-15.
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The federal SSI program, which replaced federal-state AABD
programs, continues to provide cash benefits to financially needy
persons who are 65 years of age or older, blind, or disabled. It also
provides cash benefits to children with disabilities under the age of
18. From the outset, however, the purpose of the "child's SSI pro-
gram," which targets children with disabilities under the age of 18,
has been unclear. As opposed to the former Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program and AFDC's successor,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the child's SSI
program was never intended to be a broad cash benefit program
for financially needy children." It is also not a disability benefit
program in the traditional sense. Disability benefits are intended to
compensate for loss of income due to the inability to work, and,
therefore, eligibility focuses on adult conditions and adult activi-
ties; children under the age of 18 are not part of that picture.:' Nor
is SSI a focused special needs program. Even for children with dis-
abilities typically, special needs are met through the delivery of
goods or services, such as food (or food stamps), housing, medical
care, social and educational support, etc.' °
Although the child's SSI program cannot be classified as a tradi-
tional children's benefit, disability benefit, or other type of special
need program, it provides a substantial cash benefit, by public as-
sistance standards, to an undeniably special needs group. Its
8. AFDC (or, more accurately, its predecessor Aid to Dependent Children (ADC))
was part of the original Social Security Act of 1935. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531,
tit. IV §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29, repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Although also not comprehensive in
its coverage of children-eligibility depended on the child living in a family and being de-
prived of parental support-AFDC targeted far more needy children than the relatively
small number of needy children who qualify as disabled under the SSI program. Over the
years, and especially after World War II, it became the largest and most controversial feder-
ally supported welfare program. As part of the "welfare reform" movement in the mid-1990s,
AFDC was replaced by TANF with the intention of reducing federal control over the pro-
gram and limiting benefits to a fixed number of years. See Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 116(c), 110 Stat.
2105, 2183. For a critique of TANF as welfare reform, see Peter B. Edelman, The Impart of
Welfare Reform on Children: Can We Get it Right Before the Crunch Comes?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1493
(1999); Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare As
We Know It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (1998). PRWORA
provisions relating to the child's SSI program are discussed infra at text accompanying notes
26-34.
9. This distinction is significant because traditional, adult-focused disability programs
have a particularly important role in the modem welfare state. As Deborah Stone has ob-
served, "The very notion of disability is fundamental to the architecture of the welfare state;
it is something like a keystone that allows the other supporting structures of the welfare
system and, in some sense, the economy at large to remain in place." DEBORAH A. STONE,
THE DISABLED STATE 12 (1984).
10. See examples cited supra note 3.
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purposes, however, remain largely undefined and it continues to
grapple with an eligibility standard-"disability"-that has not
been well adapted to address the unique circumstances of chil-
dren, as opposed to adults. The program also turned out, after a
slow start, to be far larger and more expensive than had been ex-
pected." It is not surprising, therefore, that it has been under
challenge, scrutiny, and attack for much of its history.
This article explores the difficult history of the child's SSI pro-
gram from a particular vantage point: the negative role that the
Social Security Administration's "sequential evaluation process" for
determining disability has played in defining the eligibility criteria
for children seeking SSI benefits.1 3 Drawing on three sets of regula-
tory efforts to implement the statutory standard for childhood
disability, based first on the original SSI legislation, then on a
seminal Supreme Court decision, and finally on amendments to
the Social Security Act overruling the Court's decision, this article
shows how the sequential evaluation process-a process that has
been, and continues to be, useful for adjudicating adult disability
claims-has been a counterproductive force in the child's SSI pro-
gram. It then suggests how the Social Security Administration
11. Thus, the program grew from approximately 212,000 beneficiaries after its first five
years (1979) to a little less than 300,000 ten years later (1989), but then more than tripled to
almost 900,000 five years after that (1994). The cost of the program grew during that last
five-year period (1989-94) from a little over $1 billion to almost $5 billion. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CHILDHOOD DISABILITY, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES 15 (1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT]. The number
reached almost one million in 1996 before beginning to decline slightly in 1998. Soc. SECU-
RITY ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 2001 20 (2001). The program's growth in
the 1990s is discussed more fully infra at text accompanying notes 154-56.
12. Various periods of this history have been well chronicled in the literature. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth J. Jameson & Stephen C. King, The Failure of the Federal Government to Care for Dis-
abled Children: A Critical Analysis of the Supplemental Security Income Program, 20 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 309 (1989); Rachelle Lombardi, The Evaluation of Children's Impairments in Deter-
mining Disability Under the Supplemental Security Income Program, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 1107
(1989); Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disability Standards
for Indigent Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 539 (1991); Gay
Gellhorn, Disability and Welfare Reform: Keep the Supplemental Security Income Program But Reen-
gineer the Disability Determination Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 961 (1995); Amber R.
Anderson, Note, Disabled Without Benefits: The Impacts of Recent Social Security Reforms on Dis-
abled Children, 41 B.C. L. REv. 125 (1999); D.J. Hilson, Who Will Help the Children: Major
Changes to the Supplemental Security Income Program Leave Thousands Unrepresented, 3 TM. Coo-
LEYJ. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 81 (1999).
13. The sequential evaluation process runs disability assessments through a series of
steps, each with its own set of criteria and its own required supporting evidence. There are
five steps for adults and three for children; hence, the title of this article. The five-step adult
sequence is described infra at Part II.B.2.a; the various incarnations of the child sequence
(first three steps, then briefly four, and now three once again), are described infra at Parts
II.B.2.b, III.C, and IV.B.
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might meet the program's goals more effectively by breaking with
the sequential evaluation model and replacing it with a unique dis-
ability determination process for children.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CHILD'S SSI PROGRAM
As noted above, federal benefits for children with disabilities
were provided for the first time in 1974 when previously existing
federal-state public assistance programs for the aged, blind, and
disabled were incorporated into the new Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program. The federalization of public assistance for
the aged, blind, and disabled, including the shift of full administra-
tive responsibility to the federal Social Security Administration, is
thus an important context for understanding the original goals
and purposes of the child's SSI program. This section begins with a
brief description of the birth of the SSI program followed by a
more detailed description of the origins of the child disability pro-
visions of the new law. It then discusses at some length the Social
Security Administration's sequential evaluation process and how
that process was first incorporated into the regulations governing
the disability determination process for children under the age of
eighteen.
A. Federalization of Public Assistance for the
Aged, Blind, and Disabled
When SSI began operating on January 1, 1974, it marked a tre-
mendous shift in responsibility for the administration of public
assistance programs in the United States-second only to the crea-
tion of the original Social Security program in 1935. Until 1935,
the federal government had not assumed general responsibility for
either social insurance or public assistance; the monumental Social
Security Act of 1935 drew a clear distinction between social insur-
ance, which became an exclusively federal responsibility, and
public assistance, responsibility for which was to be shared by the
federal government and the states. 14
14. The sharing of responsibility between the federal government and the states be-
came known as "cooperative federalism" and was particularly controversial with respect to
the administration of the AFDC program. See infra text accompanying note 18.
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Consistent with the approach to welfare practiced in England at
the time of the colonies, early social welfare programs in the
United States-to the extent they existed at all-were a matter of
local concern.' 5 The only exceptions to local and state assumption
of responsibility were various early national relief programs for war
veterans and their families. 6 Recognizing that providing for basic
subsistence needs for the poor was a necessary complement to its
due-to-be proposed national system of social insurance, the Com-
mittee on Economic Security included federally supported state
public assistance in its famous 1935 report that became the basis of
the original Social Security Act." Thus began a new chapter in the
history of social legislation and social welfare policy in the United
States that ran from Franklin Roosevelt's post-depression New Deal
through LyndonJohnson's pre-Vietnam era War on Poverty.'
The basic formula for the new federal/state public assistance
programs was simple: federal legislation authorized grants to
states for programs aimed at federally defined categories of
beneficiaries-the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children-
and the cost, once a state submitted a program consistent with fed-
eral guidelines, was shared by the federal government and the
15. At the beginning, local meant local churches and private community welfare or-
ganizations. Local governments became involved gradually with "poor houses" and other
forms of "poor relief," with great differences in coverage, conditions, and amount of bene-
fits. See Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 1, 18 (1999) ("[T]he so-called 'great poor law' enacted in 1601 served as the model
for the administration of poor relief in the United States until the 1930s."); William P. Quig-
ley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium Resemble English Poor Law of
the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 102 (1998) ("English Poor Laws are the single
most influential legal source in the historical development of the poor laws of the United
States."). See generally William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen
States, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 111 (1997); William P. Quigley, The Quicksands of the Poor Law: Poor
Relief Legislation in a Growing Nation, 1790-1820, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1 (1997); Larry Cata
Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a General Theory
of Modern American Poor Relief 44 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 871 (1995).
16. As one commentator put it, "[O]nly in times of acute national crisis such as the
Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Great Depression, has the federal government assumed
responsibility for anything resembling economic rights, or minimum welfare guarantees."
Frank E.L. Deale, The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the United States and Prospects for
Their Creation and Renewal, 43 How. L.J. 281, 288 (2000). The plight of war veterans pre-
sented a politically unique incentive for federal government involvement. See generally THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1992). See also William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the
Original Thirteen States, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 111, 176 (1997).
17. See WINIFRED BELL, AID To DEPENDENT CHILDREN 25-26, 36 (1965); J. DOUGLAS
BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 61 (1972) ("The firm foundation
of an adequate, national system of public assistance would permit the OASDI system of con-
tributory social insurance to perform more effectively in its own area of protection."). See
generally ARTHURJ. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966).
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respective states. This approach, which became know as "coopera-
tive federalism," resulted in some significant federal-state tensions
but was virtually undisputed as the dominant paradigm for thirty-
five years. 8
SSI took the next step and became the first-and so far, the
only-fully federal public assistance program. Interestingly, SSI
came into being without much fanfare, mainly because it was an
anticlimactic compromise of an even greater welfare revolution
proposed by the Nixon White House. Early in his first term, Rich-
ard Nixon proposed a radical shift away from both cooperative
federalism and the categorical approach to public assistance bene-
fits. The idea was to create a federal "Family Assistance Plan" that
would provide a minimum guaranteed income for families, as well
as the elderly, blind, and disabled.' 9 Although there was widespread
agreement that shared federal-state responsibility for public assis-
tance programs had become unmanageable, the politics proved to
be equally unmanageable and the grand plan had to be dropped.
2
Following almost four years of legislative debate and maneuvering,
the more controversial program for families with dependent chil-
dren was removed from the bill and kept as a "cooperative
federalism" program in order to make way for a new fully federal
public assistance program for the elderly, blind, and disabled. The
program that emerged was SSI, to be implemented by the federal
Social Security Administration.
18. Most of the tensions related to the AFDC program, both because of its size and be-
cause of the sensitivity of its core eligibility criterion: a child deprived of parental support.
Various state efforts to limit or to control eligibility for benefits through differing ap-
proaches to the concept of dependency led to a series of challenges by recipients and a
number of controversial Supreme Court decisions on both the state regulations involved
and the nature of cooperative federalism itself. See generally Frank S. Bloch, Cooperative Feder-
alism and the Role of Litigation in the Development of Federal AhDC Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wisc. L.
REV. 1 (1979). For a thoughtful analysis of AFDC's place in social welfare policy prior to the
1990s, see Joel E Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The
Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (1987/88).
19. See H.R. 1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. REP. No. 92-231 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989.
20. For a thorough description of this effort by President Nixon's then domestic policy
advisor (and later Democratic Senator from New York), see DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE
POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSIS-
TANCE PLAN (1973). See also CHRISTOPHER LEMAN, THE COLLAPSE OF WELFARE REFORM
(1980); VINCENTJ. BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON's GOOD DEED (1974). For a discussion of
the merits of the Family Assistance Plan, see M. KENNETH BOWLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED
INCOME PROPOSAL: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN POLICY CHANGE (1974).
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B. Something New: Benefits for Children with Disabilities
Putting aside the considerable administrative challenges facing
the Social Security Administration, the transition from the federal-
state AABD Program to SSI was relatively simple. The core re-
quirement for old-age benefits remained the same: 65 years of
age.2 ' As for blind and disabled adults, the new SSI program simply
adopted the statutory definitions of blindness and disability used in
the Social Security Act's Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance (OASDI) program.22 The OASDI disability standard is framed
in terms of the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activ-
ity" 3 due to a "medically determinable physical or mental
impairment" that must be expected to last at least twelve months or
to result in death. 4 The Act further provides that an individual
meets the statutory standard "only if his physical or mental im-
pairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of sub-
stantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."2 5 The
OASDI disability standard was thus designed to test the level of
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(l)(A) (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1) (2000). The definition of blindness is rather technical:
20/200 or less in the better eye with the use of a correcting lens or visual field limited to an
angle of no greater than 20 degrees. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (B). There were, and continue
to be, provisions that "grandfather" persons who met AABD disability standards at the time
of the changeover to SSI. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (E) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (F)
(2000). In response to concerns that large numbers of otherwise ineligible persons were
being shifted on to the state rolls at the last minute, Congress restricted grandfathered eligi-
bility to persons who were on the rolls beforeJuly 1973. See Social Security Benefits Increase,
Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 9, 87 Stat. 947, 957 (1973); 20 C.F.R. § 416.907 (2003).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000). The disability standard for Supplemental Secu-
rity Income has slightly different introductory language so that the standard is phrased in
terms of an individual who is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2000). The substance of the two standards is the same, however, and they
are interpreted consistently as being essentially identical. ,See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 140 (1987) (stating that both titles of the Social Security Act define "disability" as the
inability to engage in substantial gainful activity); Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.
1996).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000). Originally, the Act required an impairment of
"indefinite" duration. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, § 223(c) (2),
70 Stat. 807, 815.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (B) (2000) (SSI).
For a discussion of the history behind this provision and its tie to the work-related element
of the OASDI and adult SSI disability standard, see Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability
in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89
HARV. L. REv. 833 (1976).
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disability for persons insured against loss of work; as a result, it fit
the adult-centered provisions of the new SSI programs as well.
The situation was entirely different, however, with respect to
benefits for children under the age of eighteen. As mentioned
above, the SSI program extended eligibility for disability benefits to
children for the first time; under the predecessor AABD Program
(and in the OASDI program), disability benefits were provided
only to adults. The SSI legislation did not, however, address how
the special circumstances of children with disabilities should be
considered relative to eligibility for benefits; instead, it set out a
statutory standard for child disability tied to the adult standard: "in
the case of a child under the age of eighteen, [the child is dis-
abled] if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment of comparable severity [to that of a disabled
adult] .'26 This "comparable severity" standard did not itself say
much about the social policy choice of including children with dis-
abilities as beneficiaries in the new SSI program. The legislative
history offers some limited insight into the intended coverage of
the program. Far more important as a practical matter were the
Social Security Administration's regulations implementing the new
child's disability standard. Both are discussed below.
1. Rationale of Special Need--Congress sought to achieve several
goals with the 1972 Social Security Act amendments that created
the SSI program. 7 On the one hand, it wanted to assure continu-
ing support for the previously designated categories of needy
persons covered by the federal-state AABD program-the elderly,
blind, and disabled-and to provide for them a federally estab-
lished income floor.s On the other hand, Congress also wanted to
achieve welfare reform and reign in the ballooning costs of the
"cooperative federalism" model of administering federal/state
public assistance programs, particularly AFDC. 5 Tied to this con-
cern was the desire to reinforce the "deserving poor" element of
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (A)(1974).
27. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, amend-
ing, Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301-1397b (1994)).
28. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2003) ("The basic purpose underlying the supplemental
security income program is to assure a minimum level of income for people who are 65 or
over, or who are blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to
maintain a standard of living at the established Federal minimum income level.").
29. Thus, the House Report accompanying the Social Security Amendments of 1972
pointed out specific statistics such as the fact that, in 1967, federal funds for AFDC were at
$2 billion; the estimated expenditures for 1972 were $6.8 billion. See H.R. REP. No. 92-231,
pt. 1, at 1-3 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 4990.
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existing social legislation. As stated in the House Report accompa-
nying the legislation:
[T]he American people do not want a system which results in
promoting welfare as a way of life. ... Deliberations, there-
fore, have been aimed toward providing adequate assistance
to those who cannot help themselves, while at the same time
creating a system of assistance which will maximize the incen-
tive and the obligation of those who are able to work to help
themselves. °
Thus, the social goal of providing federally guaranteed aid to
those less fortunate was tied to a fiscal goal of at least controlling
the amount of public funds dedicated to welfare. The decision to
assume full federal responsibility for the less controversial elderly,
blind, and disabled group of welfare beneficiaries without being
willing to do the same for the flagship child welfare program,
AFDC, placed Congress in a difficult position: what to do about the
fact that children with disabilities had not been included in the
soon-to-be-federalized AABD program? Rather than simply ignore
this fact and restrict the disabled category of SSI beneficiaries to
adults, Congress took the opportunity to highlight the special need
of children with disabilities: "[D]isabled children who live in low-
income households are certainly among the most disadvantaged of
all Americans and... are deserving of special assistance in order to
help them become self-supporting members of our society."' Per-
haps as a way of justifying that most needy children-most notably
those that would have been covered had SSI federalized AFDC as
well-were left out of the new program, Congress rationalized its
singling out children with disabilities by comparison: "Making it
possible for disabled children to get benefits under this program, if
it is to their advantage, rather than under the programs for fami-
lies with children, would be appropriate because their needs are
often greater than those of nondisabled children.""
Other than these comments, published in the House Ways and
Means Committee's report accompanying the bill, little more was
said about this new category of SSI beneficiaries.3 Even without a
30. Id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 92-231, pt. 1, at 146-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 4989,5133-34.
32. Id., at 148, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 4989, 5134.
33. See Weishaupt & Rains, supra note 12, at 545 ("Virtually no floor debate or legisla-
tive history records congressional thinking on this addition, other than the House Ways and
Means Committee's observation."). Indeed, the entire SSI program was debated relatively
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more explicit expression of Congress' reasoning, however, the un-
derlying policy reasons for including children in the disability
coverage of SSI seem fairly clear. Professors Jameson and Wehr
have noted that three principles are at work in developing the
bases for recognizing the special needs of children: "[S]ociety has
an unusually strong economic and moral interest in ensuring that
children grow into productive adults, ... children should not be
worse off than adults [, and] ensuring comparable access to services
may require that children and adults receive different treatment
because of their inherent differences. 3 4 All three seem to be impli-
cated in Congress's recognition of the need to include children
with disabilities within the ambit of those entitled to receive funds
under SSI.
This makes intuitive sense as well. If one of Congress's goals in
enacting SSI was to decrease the amount of spending for social
welfare programs, mitigating the effects of disability for children
can serve to keep at least some of them from having to rely on pub-
lic funds for a lifetime. Certainly, money spent treating a child with
a disability may save money in the long run; perhaps providing
cash assistance to help support those same children would have the
same effect. Less clear, however, is how Congress saw child's SSI
benefits fitting in with both the general purposes of SSI and those
of the myriad of other federal programs that also target children
with disabilities.3 5 Although Congress explicitly recognized the
little, compared to the family and children provisions of the abandoned Family Assistance
Plan. See id. at 545 n.38 ("The AFDC provisions of FAP sparked most of the debate. The floor
debates only fleetingly mentioned the inclusion of children in the SSI program.") (citing
117 CONG. REc. 21, 329 (1971)). The Senate Committee on Finance would note later that
the Supreme Court had only "limited legislative history and obscure statutory language" to
rely on when it reviewed the regulations implementing the child SSI disability standard in
Sullivan v. Zebley in 1990. See S. REP. No. 104-96, at 19 (1995). The Zebley case is discussed
infra at Part III. B.
34. See Elizabeth J. Jameson & Elizabeth Wehr, Drafting National Health Care Reform Legisla-
tion to Protect the Health Interests of Children, 5 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 152, 157 (1993). The third
basis, recognizing that children and adults have differing health needs, was brought out
clearly in the amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493
U.S. 521 (1990). See Amicus Brief of American Medical Association et al. at 3; Sullivan v.
Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (No. 88-1377) ("Children's health needs differ from those of
adults in part because of the different ways children think, experience emotion or pain,
respond to stress, metabolize drugs and manifest disease."). The brief also demonstrated
support for the first proposition of aiding children to become productive adult members of
society through programs such as SSI. See id. ("A primary concern of pediatric medicine is to
prevent potentially debilitating illness or injury from arresting a child's development of the
characteristics and skills essential to adulthood.").
35. Some of these programs are listed supra in note 3. One set of commentators noted
that, "[Viarious federal programs and laws reflect... [the convention's] interest in a child with dis-
ability's right to 'a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and
facilitate the child's active participation in the community' and the services necessary to achieve these
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need to include children with disabilities in the newly created fed-
eral program as a result of the special position in which low-
income children with disabilities find themselves, the "comparable
severity" disability standard written into the law was not explained.
As a result, responsibility for setting the terms of eligibility for child
SSI benefits fell to the Social Security Administration. If Congress
had thought through exactly why it was adding this category of
beneficiaries, surely it could have come up with a more specific,
child-focused eligibility criterion. The special needs of children
with disabilities were articulated by Congress; however, the mean-
ing of and rationale for the child's SSI program statutory disability
standard was not.
2. Implementation of the "Comparable Severity" Disability Standard:
Adopting the Sequential Evaluation Model-The most obvious conse-
quence of the federalization of the AABD program was to shift
responsibility for administering the new SSI program, including
implementing the statutory disability standard, to the Social Secu-
rity Administration. 6  To be sure, the federal government,
specifically, the Department of Health and Human Services,37 had a
significant role to play under the "cooperative federalism" struc-
ture of the AABD program; however, its authority was shared with,
and influenced by, state legislatures and state and local welfare
agencies.8 Moreover, the Social Security Administration had as-
sumed historically a strong substantive role relative to the disability
provisions of the OASDI program. Although not fully clear how it
would transfer over to the SSI program, Congress had given the
Administration expressly delegated power to implement the Social
Security Act's OASDI disability standard. 9 Given the largely
rights." Alan Tomkins & Victoria Weisz, Social Science, Law, and the Interest in a Family Environment
for Children with Disabilities, 26 U. TOL L. REv. 937, 945 (1995) (quoting Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Working Group of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights; U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1989/L.88 (1989), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATORIES" 332 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992)).
36. Technically, the responsibility rested with the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services; however, most of the relevant policy work was done at the SSA
under the supervision of the Social Security Commission. Effective 1995, SSA was removed
from under DHHS and set up as an independent agency. See Social Security Independence
and Program Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 (1994).
37. Before splitting off from the Department of Education, it was the Department of
Heath, Education and Welfare.
38. For a description of the "cooperative federalism" relationship, see Bloch, supra
note 18, at 3-12.
39. This authority is stated clearly in the OASDI provisions of the Social Security Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2000):
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unexplained "comparable severity" statutory directive under the
new law and the Social Security Administration's expansive role in
implementing the cross-referenced OASDI disability standard, it is
not surprising that the Administration was quick to assert its influ-
ence over the disability requirements for children when it
promulgated the inaugural regulations for the SSI program as a
whole.
The new regulations for adult SSI disability claims were simple
to write; as the general disability standard for adults was the same
as the OASDI standard, the Social Security Administration simply
published parallel regulations for the SSI program.0 In effect, the
Administration's implementation of the new child's SSI disability
standard began when it decided to use existing OASDI regulations
for adult SSI claims. In addition to being relevant generally with
respect to child SSI claims, due to the "comparable severity" lan-
guage in the child's disability standard, substantial parts of the
adult regulations on determining disability were specifically incor-
porated into the original child's regulations as well. Because the
resulting relationship between the two sets of regulations was at the
The Commissioner of Social Security shall have full power and authority to make
rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such
provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate
and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of
taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
Thus, in an important case concerning the SSA's implementation of the general disability
standard applicable at the time to OASDI disability insurance and SSI adult disability benefit
claims, the Supreme Court noted that "Congress has 'conferred on the Secretary exception-
ally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying ... the [Social Security] Act.'"
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (quoting Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453
U.S. 34, 43 (1981)). Although the SSI provisions of the Act seem to incorporate this delega-
tion of rulemaking authority, see 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d) (1) (providing that the provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 405(a), among others, "shall apply with respect to [the SSI program] to the same
extent as they apply [with respect to OASDI]"), the Supreme Court did not apply it clearly
in its one major case that focused exclusively on the Child's SSI disability standard. Compare
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990) ("The Secretary's approach to child disability is
'manifestly contrary to the statute,' and exceeds his statutory authority." (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844)), with Zebley, 493
U.S. at 541-42 (White,J., dissenting) ("Only two Terms ago, when reviewing an aspect of the
Secretary's methodology for evaluating disability applications under this Act, we emphasized
that 'Congress has "conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority"' in this con-
text, and we stated that the Secretary's regulations were therefore entitled to great
deference. Because the majority has failed to abide by this principle, I respectfully dissent."
(citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145 (1987), quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S.
458, 466 (1983))).
40. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-1694 (2003) (OASDI) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.901-
.1094 (2003) (SSI).
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heart of subsequent challenges to the child's regulations discussed
later in this article, the adult regulations will be described in some
detail before proceeding to the original child's regulations.
a. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation for Adults-The Social Security
Administration uses a five-step "sequential evaluation process" to
determine disability for all OASDI and adult SSI claims. 4' Although
not codified as formal regulations until the late 1970s,42 the same 5-
step process had already been in regular use for some time.43 It re-
mains in use today throughout the administrative process and is
fully accepted by the courts as the framework for analysis of a So-
cial Security disability claim."
The sequential evaluation process is designed to test a claimant's
evidence of disability in different contexts, each of which raises dif-
ferent factual and legal issues relative to a finding of disability. It
operates somewhat like a flow chart; at each level, depending on
the facts, the claim is either resolved (depending on the level, ei-
ther with a finding that the claimant is disabled or that the
claimant is not disabled), or, if that finding cannot be made, then
the process continues to the next step. For evaluations that reach
the fifth and final level, the process dictates finally-again, de-
pending on the facts-whether the claimant is disabled or not.
In effect, the sequential evaluation process asks a series of ques-
tions. The first question is whether the claimant is performing
substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is considered not dis-
abled, regardless of his or her medical condition, and the process
41. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003). See also Soc. Sec. Ruling 82-56, 1975-
1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 762 (1982). Earlier regulations had used the term "sequential
evaluation process" to describe this procedure, and that term is still widely used. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1503 (1980); Lofton v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. The regulations passed through a series of notices in the Federal Register, with the
first effective date in 1979. See Federal Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 43 Fed. Reg. 9284
(Mar. 7, 1978) (taking effect Feb. 25, 1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 38,879 (July 3, 1979); 45 Fed. Reg.
55,566 (Aug. 20, 1980) (final regulations; codified at 20 C.ER. Parts 404, 416).
43. See, e.g., Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981) ("To regularize the adjudi-
cative process, the Social Security Administration has recently promulgated new and
detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that
take into account a claimant's age, education, and work experience in addition to his medi-
cal condition.").
44. See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d
422, 428 (3d Cir, 1999); Beech v. Apfel, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (S.D. Ala. 2000). As one
court stated, "It is important for the [administrative lawjudge] to follow the orderly frame-
work set out in the [sequential evaluation regulations] to ensure uniformity and regularity
in outcome as well as fairness to the claimant." Mitchell v. Schweiker, 551 F Supp. 1084,
1087-88 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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ends.45 If the claimant is not currently engaging in substantial gain-
ful activity, the process moves to the second question, which is
whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment that significantly
limits his or her ability to perform work. If not, the claimant is con-
sidered not disabled and the process ends there.46 If the claimant
does have a severe impairment, the evaluation process continues
on to a third question, which asks whether the claimant's medical
condition meets or equals the requirements set out for certain im-
pairments in an appendix to the Social Security regulations known
as the Listing of Impairments. 7 If so, the claimant is considered
disabled and the process stops at this third step . If the claimant's
impairment does not meet the requirements of the Listing, the
claim continues to a fourth step, which asks a medical-vocational
question: is the claimant prevented from performing his or her
past relevant work? If not, the claimant is considered not disabled
and, once again, the process stops there.49 If the claimant is pre-
vented from performing past relevant work, the sequential
evaluation process reaches its final step, which addresses the ulti-
mate medical-vocational standard for disability benefits:
considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, educa-
tion, and prior work experience, can he or she perform other
substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy? If such other work exists, the claimant is not
disabled; if such work does not exist, then he or she is disabled. 0
45. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (2003) ("If you are working and the work you
are doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regardless of
your medical condition or your age, education, and work experience.").
46. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (2003) ("If you do not have any impairment
or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,
therefore, not disabled.").
47. The Listing of Impairments and the concept of "medical equivalence" to a listed
impairment are described infra at text accompanying notes 56-62.
48. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (2003) ("If you have an impairment(s) which
meets the duration requirement and is listed in [the Listing of Impairments] or is equal to a
listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and
work experience.").
49. 20 CER. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2003) ("If we cannot make a decision based
on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impair-
ment(s), we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental
demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will
find that you are not disabled.").
50. 20 C.ER. §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1) (2003) ("If you cannot do any work you
have done in the past because you have a severe impairment(s), we will consider your resid-
ual functional capacity and your age, education, and past work experience to see if you can
do other work. If you cannot, we will find you disabled."). A different rule is applied at this
step for claimants who did only "arduous unskilled physical labor" for 35 years or more and
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Generally, claimants have the burden of proof on the issue of
disability!" However, neither the Social Security Act nor the Social
Security regulations specify how the claimant's burden operates in
the context of the sequential evaluation process. Nonetheless, case
law makes it clear that, upon proof by a claimant at Step 4 that he
or she cannot perform prior work, the burden shifts to the Social
Security Administration at Step 5 to prove that the claimant can
52perform other work available in the national economy.
When followed fairly and correctly, the sequential evaluation
process is an effective way to reach decisions in accordance with
the words and goals of the statutory disability standard. The first
three steps are the most efficient. Claimants who are working and
thereby demonstrate that they are not "unable to perform substan-
tial gainful activity" (Step 1) and those with no severe impairments
(Step 2) are denied quickly and relatively easily. At one point, the
"severe impairment" requirement of Step 2 came under sustained
attack on the ground that it was being misused to deny claims that
would, or at least could, be granted at Steps 4 or 5. The controversy
was resolved in 1987 when the Supreme Court upheld Step 2 as
applied by the Administration, noting that "[i]f the impairments
are not severe enough to limit significantly the claimant's ability to
perform most jobs, by definition the impairment does not prevent
the claimant from engaging in any substantial gainful activity."53 In
an often-cited concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor found that
the Administration did not intend to implement more than a de
minimis severity requirement and urged that it be applied only to
"claimants with slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit
any 'basic work activity.' 54 Claimants with impairments that match
or equal the quite strict criteria set forth in the Listing of Impair-
ments (Step 3) are granted benefits quickly and relatively
objectively.
with only a "marginal" education. 20 C.ER. §§ 404.1520(0(2), 416.920(f) (2) (2003). See also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1562, 416.962 (2003).
51. See 20 C.FR. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)
(2000) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes
such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social
Security may require.").
52. See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n.5 (1987); Erickson v. Shalala, 9
F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
53. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 at 146.
54. Id. at 158 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Later cases have confirmed a de minimis se-
verity requirement at Step 2. See, e.g., Corrao v. Shalala, 20 E3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1994);
Hudson v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1392, 1396 (8th Cir. 1989).
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The third step in the sequential evaluation process deserves spe-
cial attention because of its prominent role in child SSI disability
regulations." This step revolves around the application of the So-
cial Security Administration's Listing of Impairments, which
identifies a number of specified impairments and the medical find-
ings necessary to show that a claimant with that impairment is
disabled. 6 The claimant's impairments are compared to the crite-
ria set out in the Listing and, as noted earlier, if an impairment
meets the requirements of a listed impairment then the claimant is
considered disabled. If not, a claimant can still be found disabled if
the same or other impairments, alone or in combination, are the
"medical equivalent" of a listed impairment.57
The criteria in the Listing are quite strict and are based on the
notion of per se disability; to qualify, a claimant must have physical
and mental impairments that are "severe enough to prevent a per-
son from doing any gainful activity." 8 All of the findings in the
Listing require medical evidence; vocational factors are not con-
sidered. This is the case for claimants wishing to show medical
equivalence as well, which is further defined in the regulations as
requiring "medical findings ... at least equal in severity and dura-
tion to the listed findings. ''"' A comparison is made between the
symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings relative to the claimant's
impairment or impairments and the medical criteria of a particular
55. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2.b, IlLC, and IV.B.
56. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1 (2003). The Listing is divided into two parts: Part
A deals with those impairments that affect adults and children in the same manner; Part B
deals with impairments that only affect children. There are thirteen sections in the Listing,
each covering a different major body system. The first part of each section is a general in-
troduction that defines terms used in that section and may spell out exact medical findings
necessary to meet particular listings. The introduction is then followed by a "Category of
Impairments," which sets forth individual impairments of the relevant body system and the
medical findings necessary to show that a claimant with that impairment is disabled.
57. The claimant has the burden of proof in providing the medical findings necessary
to show that his or her impairment meets a listing. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a)
(2003).
58. 20 C.FR. § 404.1525(a) (2003). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (2003). The SSI
regulations include additional language on listing-level severity applicable only to children.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (2003).
59. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a) (2003). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(b), 416.926(a), (b)
(2003) ("Medical equivalence must be based on medical findings. We will always base our
decision about whether your impairment(s) is medically equal to a listed impairment on
medical evidence only. Any medical findings in the evidence must be supported by medi-
cally acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."); Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d
683, 688 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Whether a claimant's condition equals a listed impairment is
strictly a medical determination."). For a discussion of SSA's policy on medical equivalence,
see Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-6p (1996).
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listingY0 Medical equivalence can be based on more than one im-
pairment if no one impairment equals a listed impairment; in such
cases, the question is whether the symptoms, signs, and laboratory
findings of a combination of the claimant's impairments are medi-
cally equal to the criteria of a particular listing."'
This "any gainful activity" standard used in the Listing-often
referred to as "listing-level severity"-has its origins in the former
special disability standard for disabled spouses and stands in spe-
cific contrast to the "substantial gainful activity" standard used for
most disability claims.62 The bar was set extra-high so that only the
most clearly disabled claimants could establish eligibility automati-
cally on medical findings alone. For claimants whose medical
condition does not match or equal the strict Listing criteria, they
can continue through two more steps and show nonetheless that
they can not engage in substantial gainful activity.
The last two steps of the sequential evaluation process take on
the closer cases-those that cannot be resolved through the first
three steps-and address the more complex medical-vocational
aspects of the adult statutory disability standard. Step 4 is still rela-
tively focused; it looks at jobs that the claimant held in the
relatively recent past and that would qualify as substantial gainful
activity. 63 Claimants who can still perform any of those jobs that, by
definition, are within their vocational competence, are denied bene-
fits on that ground.64 Only at Step 5, when the Social Security
Administration has the burden of proof, does the process deal with
the open-ended, ultimate question of whether the claimant can per-
form any jobs at all, given his or her age, education, and work
experience. For both Steps 4 & 5, the claimant is assigned a residual
60. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a), 416.926(a) (2003). The listing used to determine medi-
cal equivalence is- the listing for the particular impairment or, if that impairment is not
listed, the listing of the impairment most like the claimant's impairment included in the
Listing of Impairments will be used. Id.
61. Id.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
63. Work performed up to 15 years earlier qualifies as past relevant work; work per-
formed more than 15 years earlier will "ordinarily" not be considered. See 20 CFR
§§ 404.1565(a), 416.965(a) (2003).
64. Step 4 evaluations are not always simple. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 1040,
1042 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that claimant who could perform prior work as a maid, but
whose earnings at that job were insufficient to constitute substantial gainful activity, was
improperly denied benefits). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court reversed a divided
Third Circuit panel that had held that a claim cannot be denied at Step 4 if the claimant can
perform prior work that no longer exists in the national economy. See Thomas v. Commis-
sioner, 294 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 2002), revd Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376, __ U.S. __
(2003).
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functional capacity (often referred to as RFC), which represents
the level of work, if any, that the claimant has the capacity to per-
form. Then, by taking into account the claimant's RFC, age,
education, and prior work experience, a decision is reached
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work or, if not,
whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national
economy that he or she can perform.
For the most difficult cases, those that must address the full
medical-vocational reach of the statutory disability standard at Step
5, the federal regulations provide a special set of rules and tables
known as the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.66 The heart of the
Guidelines is the so-called "grids," which include three tables cov-
ering different levels of RFC. Based on data from various
government publications,"" each table has a set of "rules" consisting
of three columns that account for a claimant's age, education, and
previous work experience, and a fourth column that directs a deci-
sion of disabled or not disabled. Thus, provided a claimant's
vocational factors and residual functional capacity coincide with all
of the criteria of a particular rule, that rule directs a conclusionS 69
that the claimant is or is not disabled. For example, if a claimant
is limited to light work, is closely approaching advanced age
65. A claimant's RFC is based on his or her physical and mental limitations and how
they affect his or her ability to work; it is an evaluation of "what [the claimant] can still do
despite [those] limitations." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003). The basic re-
quirements for sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy work focus on exertional
limitations and are set out specifically in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967
(2003). For example, sedentary work requires the ability to lift a maximum of 10 pounds at
one time, to lift or carry light objects occasionally, such as files or small tools, and can re-
quire occasional walking or standing. See20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a) (2003).
66. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 (2003).
67. Table I applies to individuals whose residual functional capacity limits them to
sedentary work, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 201.00 (2003); Table 2 to those limited to
light work, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 202.00 (2003); and Table 3 to those limited to
medium work, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 203.00 (2003). No tables exist for indi-
viduals still able to perform heavy or very heavy work because the Guidelines state, in effect,
that regardless of their age, education, or work experience, sufficient jobs exist in the na-
tional economy for such individuals to pursue substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404
Subpt. P App. 2 § 204.00 (2003).
68. These include, most notably, the Dictionary of Occupational Tides and the Occu-
pation Outlook Handbook, both published by the Department of Labor. See 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 200.00(b) (2003).
69. See generally Kathleen Pickering, Note, Social Security Disability Determinations: The Use
and Abuse of the Grid System, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1983). Although the Guidelines had their
critics, see, e.g., John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A
Study of Social Security's Medical-Vocational Guidelines-Two Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-Holing
Claimants, 42 MD. L. REv. 329 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld them in 1983. Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983). The Court made it clear, however, that the Guidelines'
grids can be used to determine disability only where the claimant's particular circumstances
match each of the component parts of the particular rule. Heckler, 461 U.S. at 462 n.5.
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(defined as between the ages of 50 and 54), is illiterate, and has
either no previous work experience or previous work experience
limited to unskilled labor, the grids would direct a finding that the
claimant is disabled.7 ° On the other hand, if that same claimant
were at least literate, then the grids would direct a finding that the
claimant is not disabled.7' If a claimant's RFC or relevant vocational
factors are different from those reflected in a particular grid rule,
the Guidelines cannot be used to meet the Administration's bur-
den of proof.72 In such cases, there must be proof that specific jobs
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform, given his or her impairments, age, educa-
tion, and prior work experience.73
b. Three-Step Sequential Evaluation for Children-When it came
time to implement the disability standard for the child's SSI
program, the Social Security Administration opted to cut off the
sequential evaluation process for child SSI claims after the first three
steps.74 Thus, after passing through the first two steps of the process
(by showing that the were not engaged in substantial gainful activity
and had a severe impairment), claimants under the age of 18 had to
prove that they had an impairment, or combination of impairments,
that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of
Impairments. 75 In other words, there was no post-Step 3 evaluation
of a child SSI claim comparable to the fourth and fifth steps of the
sequential evaluation process used for adult disability evaluations.
70. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 202.09 (2003).
71. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P App. 2 § 202.10 (2003).
72. This policy is reflected in the Guidelines themselves. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P
App. 2 (Guidelines) § 200.00(a) (2003).
73. Typically, this proof comes from a vocational expert, either in a written report or,
at the administrative hearing level, through live testimony. Although regulations provide
that the Social Security Administration will choose when to use vocational experts, 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e) (2003), sometimes they are required. See, e.g., Luna v. Shalala, 22
F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]here a non-exertional limitation might substantially re-
duce a range of work an individual can perform, the ALJ must consult a vocational
expert."); Wheeler v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1989) (vocational expert re-
quired where claimant had severe mental impairment).
74. As mentioned earlier, the sequential evaluation process was not codified formally
until the late 1970; as a result, the three-step process for determining child disability for SSI
was not committed to regulations until then as well. However, as was the case with the adult
5-step process, the 3-step process for child SSI claims had been in use before the formal
regulations were promulgated. See, e.g., Winfield v. Mathews, 571 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.
1978) ("For children under the age of 18, their impairments, if not listed in the Appendix,
must be 'medically the equivalent of a listed impairment.'" (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.901
(1977))).
75. 20 C.ER. § 416.923 (1974). The regulations also outlined when the Administration
would find that a claimant met or equaled a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923(b)
(1974).
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To mitigate the limiting effect of determining children's disabilities
solely on the basis of the Listing of Impairments, the
Administration added a separate Part B to the Listing to be used
only for child claimants, which was intended to supplement the
adult listings for impairments where the adult listings alone would
not be appropriate for evaluating children.6
This truncated sequential evaluation process was not a new idea.
When spouses became eligible for dependent and survivor disabil-
ity benefits (claiming insurance benefits due to their own disability
but on the earnings record of their elderly, disabled, or deceased
spouse) in the 1950s, the Administration used the same three-step
approach. 7 However, as explained in more detail below, the three-
step sequential evaluation process used for disabled spouse claims
was implemented to apply a stricter disability standard for that
group of beneficiaries. Until 1991, the statutory standard for dis-
abled spouse claims required a showing that a claimant could not
engage in "any gainful activity," as opposed to "any substantial
gainful activity," and expressly precluded the consideration of voca-
tional factors.8
The decision to use, in effect, the same sequential evaluation
process for child SSI claims as was being used for disabled spouse
claims was odd, given the difference between the restrictive "any
gainful activity" standard for spouses and the open-ended "compa-
rable severity" standard for children. Making Step 3 the final step
for children was also at odds with its limited role in the five-step
process used for adult SSI claims. It was not as if the Social Security
Administration denied that the Social Security Act provided that
children with impairments comparable to those that would qualify
for an adult were entitled to benefits.79 In response to comments to
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 14,705 (Mar. 16, 1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404, App. 1, Subpart P (Part B)
(2003). As explained further by the Social Security Administration, Part B corresponds to
Part A "for those impairments common to both adults and children.... with modifications
of the adult criteria, where necessary, to take into account the different impact on children.
In addition, [Part B] contains impairments that are generally seen only in children." 42 Fed.
Reg. 14,705, at 14,706. Generally, children are evaluated first under Part B; if the criteria set
forth in Part B do not apply to the particular claim, then Part A can be used. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.925(b) (2) (2003).
77. This was the case even before the sequential evaluation process was codified for-
mally in the regulations. See, e.g., Zanoviak v. Finch, 314 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(noting that eligibility could be based on "extremely specific" listing of "particular disabili-
ties" or if an "impairment or cumulative impairments are determined medically to be the
equivalent in severity and duration of a specific impairment listed in the Appendix"). See also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1578 (2003) (still applicable to periods of disability prior to 1991).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
79. The original SSI regulations reworded the statutory "comparable severity" lan-
guage without changing its effect, providing that children under the age of 18 would be
found disabled if they were suffering from any "medically determinable physical or mental
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its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the effect that requiring
children under the age of 18 to have an impairment that met or
equaled the Listing of Impairments in order to be found disabled
conflicted with the "comparable severity" standard in the Act, the
Administration responded that "the use of vocational factors is not
appropriate since the activities of children under age 18 are ex-
tremely difficult to measure in vocational terms." s° The
Administration did not, however, address the substance behind
those comments-that since an adult could be found to be dis-
abled on the basis of vocational considerations even when their
impairment did not meet or equal the Listing of Impairments, re-
quiring children under age 18 to meet or equal the criteria in the
Listing meant, in effect, that they had to have a more severe im-
pairment than an adult to qualify for benefits. Instead, the
Administration stated that it was "more equitable" to evaluate chil-
dren's claims using only medical evidence and noted that it was
adding supplemental listings for children to account for the fact
that certain conditions have a different effect on children than on
adults: "This supplement realistically expands the area of medical
consideration for children, and lessens any inequity that could re-
sult because of the absence of vocational evaluation."'
With this regulatory regime in place, SSI disability assessments
for newly covered children with disabilities focused exclusively on
specifically listed criteria for selected identified impairments set
out in the Listing of Impairments. The child's SSI regulations did
include findings of medical equivalence of a listed impairment as a
basis for disability, which allowed some room to evaluate child dis-
ability claims outside the precise requirements of the Listing.
However, medical equivalence assessments were tied closely to the
Listing's criteria. As a result, the limits of the new child's SSI pro-
gram-what the "comparable severity" disability standard really
meant-had to be tested through the relatively narrow window of
medical equivalence or by challenging the limited three-step se-
quential process as inconsistent with the Social Security Act.
impairment" which compares in severity to an impairment that would make an adult (a
person over age eighteen) disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.906 (1974).
80. Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits; Supplemental Secu-
rity Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,566, 55,570 (Aug. 20, 1980).
81. Id., 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,570-71 (Aug. 20,1980).
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III. FROM THREE STEPS TO FOUR: SULLIVAN V. ZEBLEY
AND THE INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUALIZED
FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENTS
As noted above, the Social Security Administration's three-step
sequential evaluation process for child SSI benefits requiring a
child to meet or equal the requirements of the Listing of Impair-
ments was questioned from the beginning as fundamentally
inconsistent with the "comparable severity" language of the Social
Security Act. Two different approaches emerged in response to this
restrictive implementation of the statutory standard: efforts to lib-
eralize Step 3 by expanding the concept of "medical equivalence"
to a listed impairment; and direct challenges to the three-step
process itself as inconsistent with the Social Security Act. Over
time, some cases did begin to expand the scope of medical equiva-
lence at Step 3; however, in the end it was the direct challenges
that took center stage-culminating with the Supreme Court's
1990 Sullivan v. Zebley decision that overruled the Administration's
three-step approach .
This Section examines the fate of the three-step sequential
evaluation process for child SSI claims. It begins by reviewing two
sets of pre-Zebley cases: those that challenged the three-step process
as used for dependent spouse claims and those that challenged it
in the context of child SSI claims. With respect to both types of
claims, cases that focused on the meaning of medical equivalence
are discussed as well. This section continues with an analysis of the
Zebley decision and then concludes with a description of the regula-
tions promulgated by the Social Security Administration to
implement Zebley. The next Section chronicles the downfall of
ZebLey, brought about in large measure by Congressional reaction
to the Administration's post-Zeb/ey regulations.
A. Pre-Zebley Cases
The three-step sequential evaluation process used to implement
the "comparable severity" standard for child SSI claims posed two
related, but ultimately quite different, legal issues: what Step 3 ac-
complished by looking at whether a claimant met or equaled the
requirements of the Listing of Impairments and whether stopping
82. Zeb/ey is discussed at length infra at Part II.1B.
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the inquiry at Step 3 allowed for a full evaluation under the statu-
tory standard. The issues differed in that the first focused on the
application of Step 3 while the second focused on its role in the
disability determination process. They also differed because cases
seeking to construe Step 3 would apply to all types of disability
claims, including those for which Step 3 was only an optional route
for finding disability in a five-step sequential evaluation process.
Cases that challenged Step 3 as the final step in the sequential
evaluation process arose only in the context of claims for child SSI
or dependent spouse benefits. The two issues were tied together in
the sense that if the answer to the first question-what does a
medical equivalence assessment entail-was something short of
evaluating whether a child's impairment was comparable to a
qualifying impairment for an adult, then the answer to the second
question-whether the three-step process fully implemented the
"comparable severity" standard-would have to be "no."
The basic arguments in the child SSI cases challenging the
three-step sequential evaluation process were essentially the same
as those litigated by dependent spouses, even though the underly-
ing statutory disability standards were quite different. Although the
contexts in which the two sets of cases were litigated-wage earn-
ers' disabled dependent spouses seeking benefits as opposed to
low-income children with disabilities-were also quite different,
the fate of the two sets of three-step sequential evaluation regula-
tions often were intertwined. Therefore, cases challenging the
three-step process for dependent spouse benefits, many of which
were litigated even before SSI was enacted, will be discussed briefly
below before moving on to those involving child SSI claims.
1. Disabled Spouse Cases-As with the child's SSI program, Con-
gress had set out a separate disability standard for disabled
dependent spouses when they became eligible for benefits under
the OASDI program in 1967. The difference, however, is that the
separate statutory standard for dependent spouses really was dif-
ferent. At all times relevant to this discussion, from when
dependent spouse benefits were first made available until the dis-
abled spouse standard was amended to conform with the general
disability standard in 1991, dependent spouses had to show that
their physical or mental impairments were "of a level of severity...
sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful
activity."83 Not only did this standard substitute "any gainful activity"
83. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1988) (amended 1990). The Act also expressly author-
ized the Social Security Administration to define this level of severity by regulation. Id.
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for the more liberal "any substantial gainful activity" requirement
used for wage earners' benefits, it specifically stated that a spouse's
ability to engage in any gainful activity had to be determined with-
out considering non-medical vocational factors, such as age,
education, and work experience, that are included in other adult
disability assessments.
84
Congress was well aware that it was setting a stricter disability
standard for these new beneficiaries. As noted by the Senate
Committee on Finance in its report on the 1967 amendments, the
new category of benefits for disabled spouses was being added
"under a test of disability that is somewhat more restrictive than
that for disabled workers." 5 Congress was motivated, at least in
part, by the very practical concern that using the more liberal "sub-
stantial gainful activity" standard could prove too costly.86
The Social Security Administration thus set out to implement
this new, stricter disability standard with a separate disability de-
termination process. Even before the sequential evaluation process
was codified and before the Listing of Impairments was published,
claimants for dependent spouse benefits had to show that they had
an impairment that was on a prescribed list or was the equivalent
of an impairment on the list."' Later, after the Listing of Impair-
ments was published, the requirement was stated as meeting or
equaling the criteria set out in the formal Listing.88
In a series of cases beginning in the early 1970s, claimants
charged that restricting dependent spouse benefits to persons with
a listed impairment, or the medical equivalent, violated the Social
Security Act and the Constitution. All of the early cases challenging
the implementing regulations failed, with the courts ruling that the
Social Security Administration had acted well within its delegated
authority to establish guidelines for eligibility.89 In response to
84. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) (1988) (amended 1990).
85. S. REP. No. 90-744, at 49 (1967), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 2883. See also Hollis
v. Mathews, 520 F.2d 338, 340 ("Congress established more stringent eligibility standards for
widow disability benefits than for other categories of beneficiaries.").
86. See 113 CONG. REc. 23,049 (1967) (statement of then Chair of the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means: "A stricter test of disability than [that used for wage earners] would
apply to widows and widowers .... We wrote this provision of the bill very narrowly because it
represents a step into an unexplored area where cost potentials are an important considera-
tion.").
87. See supra note 77.
88. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1980).
89. See, e.g., Frasier v. Finch, 313 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ala.), afffd sub nom. Frasier v.
Richardson, 434 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1970) (approving delegation of authority and noting that
SSA regulations "are presumptively valid and should not be disturbed unless they are incon-
sistent with the statute or unreasonable"); Zanoviak v. Finch, 314 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D. Pa.
1970); Gillock v. Richardson, 322 E Supp. 354, 357 (D. Kan. 1970) ("The Court could well
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arguments that disabled spouse claims should have been evaluated
according to the same process used for claims filed by disabled
wage earners, courts pointed specifically to the legislative history
mentioned above that made it clear that Congress had intended to
create a higher and more restrictive standard for disabled spouses
with the "any gainful activity" language in the Act.9" Constitutional
challenges were uniformly unsuccessful as well. 9'
Later cases, beginning in the early 1980s, focused on the mean-
ing of "medical equivalence" at Step 3 and sought to extend its
reach by arguing that spouse disability assessments, regardless of
the number of steps involved, must address fully the "any gainful
activity" statutory standard.92 They began to draw a distinction be-
tween considering vocational factors at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process, which the statute expressly precluded for
spouse claims, and measuring residual functional capacity at the
beginning of Step 4. As the Second Circuit put it, in one of the ear-
lier of these cases:
It would be entirely understandable that benefits would be de-
nied after a determination that a widow did not have an
impairment equivalent to a listed impairment if that conclusion
were based on a determination that the claimant's residual
functional capacity left the claimant with adequate capacity to
perform "any" gainful activity. On the other hand, if the claim-
ant's residual functional capacity leaves that person unable to
agree with the Examiner's comment that it is difficult to visualize [the claimant] in any situa-
tion of gainful employment, but this, of course, is not the test. Congress has given the [SSAI
full authority to govern the issue by regulation."). This delegation of authority is discussed at
note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
90. See Davidson v. Secretary, 912 F.2d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The legislative his-
tory of the section of the Act allowing for disabled widow's benefits makes it clear that
Congress contemplated a stricter standard to be used."); Sullivan v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d
855, 862 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975) ("The legislative history of the
Social Security Amendments of 1967 makes clear that Congress intended widows' benefits to
be paid only for a disabling medical impairment, not simply for an inability to obtain em-
ployment.").
91. See Sims v. Harris, 607 E.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the statutory
classification "is sufficiently rational to be upheld against plaintiffs' equal protection chal-
lenge"); Wokojance v. Weinberger, 513 F.2id 210, 212-13 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that while
"[tihere can be no doubt that the Social Security Act is subject to scrutiny under equal pro-
tection concepts implicit in the due process clause[,] ... Congress has wide latitude in the
area of social welfare legislation" and the statutory classification survives rational basis re-
view); Sullivan v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 855, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1974).
92. See, e.g., Paris v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Viewing [the claim-
ant's] conditions as a whole, we find it impossible to reasonably conclude that she is capable
of any gainful activity. This standard is the core of the medical equivalence test and we find
that [the claimant] has met it.").
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perform any such activity, then it is difficult to see how the
impairment would fail to be the equivalent of some impair-
ment on a list of what purports to be impairments
"considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing
any gainful activity.'' 3
The progress of these cases was cut short, however, when Con-
gress amended the Social Security Act in 1991 to make the
standards for determining disability the same for both wage earner
and dependent spouse claims.94
The question of what Step 3 medical equivalence meant in this
context thus became moot, except for an increasingly small num-
ber of claims that involve periods of disability before 1991. 95 It is
worth noting, however, that by the time the statute was amended, a
majority of the circuits had held that a dependent spouse's residual
functional capacity must be considered under the "any gainful ac-
tivity" standard, regardless of the number of steps used in the
disability determination process.96 The courts' reasoning was simi-
lar to that expressed initially by the Second Circuit: without an
administrative determination of residual functional capacity, the
Administration lacked sufficient information to determine whether
the claimant was actually able to engage in "any gainful activity. '
93. Tolany v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1525(a) (1984)).
94. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 5103, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-251 (1990). This action was taken in recognition of the differences between
the two standards and was seen as the fair thing to do, not as externally required in any way.
Thus, the Senate report noted, "[t]his landmark legislative provision removes a major ineq-
uity in the Social Security program, and will assist many thousands of deserving older
Americans in the future." S. RE~P. No. 102-28, pt. 1, at 31 (1991), 1991 WL 52579 (Leg.
Hist.). See generally Social Security Benefits for Widows and Spouses: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-20 (1990).
95. Current disabled spouse claims covering a period of disability prior to 1991 are
governed by the same regulations that were in place before the 1990 amendments. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1577-.1578 (2003).
96. See Marcus v. Sullivan, 926 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The language of Section
423(d) (2) (B) itself indicates that a determination of the individual's impairments and func-
tional capabilities must supplement any mechanical comparison of medical findings with
the Listing."); Finkelstein v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1991); Bennett v. Sullivan,
917 F.2d 157, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1990); Davidson v. Sec'y of HHS, 912 F.2d 1246, 1253-54
(10th Cir. 1990); Ruff v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1990); Cassas v. Sec'y of HHS,
893 F.2d 454, 458 (1st Cir. 1990); Kier v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1989).
97. See, e.g., Marcus, 926 F.2d at 610 (noting that "the Listing represents a non-
exhaustive sampling of impairments"); Cassass, 893 E2d at 458 (noting that "the listings do
not exhaust the entire universe of incapacities [therefore] residual functional capacity can-
not be ignored in considering medical equivalence"). One court stated broadly that "the
Secretary's regulations setting forth the factors to be considered in analysis of the impair-
ments of a claimant for disabled widow's benefits are 'manifestly contrary to the statute.'"
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The argument was a weaker version of the argument that was about
to prevail at the Supreme Court for child SSI claims; however, the
relief obtained-statutory amendment-proved to be more per-
manent than the Court's ruling.98
2. Child SSI Cases--Challenges to the use of a three-step sequen-
tial evaluation process for child SSI claims were more successful,
although not initially. The Eleventh Circuit was the first appellate
court to rule on the regulations and their consistency with the
"comparable severity" statutory disability standard. In a 1982 deci-
sion, after the bulk of the unsuccessful direct challenges to the
dependent spouse benefits standard had failed but before the sec-
ond group of spouse cases supporting residual functional
assessments as part of the determination of medical equivalence
had been filed, the court held that the regulations were not incon-
sistent with the language of the Social Security Act.99 Noting that
Congress did not define "comparable severity" in the statute and
the lack of legislative history on that particular language, the court
reasoned that this reinforced the special deference given to the
Social Security Administration to implement the statute by prom-
ulgating regulations intended to achieve the statutory goal."' The
court also echoed statements made by the Administration in re-
sponse to comments critical of the regulations filed following its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, finding that there was a legitimate
reason not to include an RFC analysis when assessing child claim-
ants: children under eighteen have no attachment to the
workforce; therefore, a vocational analysis is not feasible or neces-
sary.'0 ' Cutting off a child's disability determination process at step
three of the five-step adult analysis was not inequitable; it was a
practical necessity.
The Fifth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit two years later.
02
Reasoning that the "comparable severity" language in the statute
Davidson, 912 F.2d at 1254 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
98. For a discussion of the parallels between the two sets of arguments, see Michael G.
Ruppert & Thomas M. Weinland, Developments in Social Security Law, 24 IND. L. Rav. 1109,
1117-21 (1991).
99. Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982). The statutory standard is dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying notes 26-34.
100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id. at 1362. These comments are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 80-81.
102. Hinckley v. Sec'y of HHS, 742 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1984). Two other circuits held that
the Secretary properly denied benefits under the regulations but did not rule directly on the
validity of the regulations themselves. See Nash v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that because "the issue will be decisively addressed by the Supreme Court in the
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indicated that Congress did not intend that child and adult claims
be evaluated according to identical standards, the court accepted,
as had the Fifth Circuit, the Administration's logic that assessing a
child's residual functional capacity to work was unnecessary: "Since
children seldom work even if they have no impairment, it would be
inappropriate to consider whether a child is able to engage in 'sub-
stantial gainful activity.' ,,10 Having found the three-step process
reasonable, the court upheld that choice as within the range of
permissible administrative regulation and thus deserving defer-
104ence.
The view that a three-step, listings-only approach carried out the
"comparable severity" mandate of the Act effectively was not, how-
ever, unanimous. In Zebley v. Bowen, 0 5 the Third Circuit held that
the statutory standard required children to be assessed on an indi-
vidual basis similar to adults and that the regulations were invalid
because they failed to accomplish that result. 10 6 The court rejected
explicitly the arguments accepted by the Eleventh and Fifth Cir-
cuits, finding that Congress intended that children be given an
opportunity for individual assessment "comparable to the residual
functional capacity assessment for adults.",0 7 The court reasoned, in
effect, that because adults were given an opportunity to be judged
individually and outside the narrow constraints of Step 3, children
should be affordted the same privilege. Although some courts
noted similar arguments concerning the limited use of medical
equivalence, this issue was not addressed fully in the child's SSI
cases-perhaps because of the inherent difficulty of pairing two
amorphous concepts like "comparable severity" and "medical
equivalence."' 0 Before that issue could be developed further, the
Supreme Court took on the direct challenge.
near future" it need not decide the validity of the regulations but that "as applied in this case
[the regulation] is not invalid"); Burnside v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 22.
104. Id. at 23 ("[T]he fact that we are able to devise broader standards for measuring
disabilities in children does not permit us to strike down the reasonable standard promul-
gated by the Secretary pursuant to her statutory authority.").
105. 855 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. Zebley, 855 F.2d at 76.
107. Id. Commentators also went against the weight of authority among the circuit
courts and argued that the original regulations were too restrictive. See generally Jameson &
King, supra note 12; Lombardi, supra note 12.
108. See, e.g., Cornelious v. Sec'y of HHS, 655 F. Supp. 1211, 1213-14 (W.D.N.Y. 1987);
Powell v. Schweiker, 514 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D. Fla. 1981).
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B. Sullivan v. Zebley
The Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits in
1990 by affirming the Third Circuit and requiring that the Social
Security Administration issue new regulations that would more
closely resemble the adult sequential evaluation process.109 The
Court began its analysis by noting the very simple proposition that,
by the terms of the statute itself, a child was "entitled to benefits if
his impairment is as severe as one that would prevent an adult
from working."" The Court then looked in depth at the sequential
evaluation regulations, focusing in particular on Step 3 and the
role of the Listing of Impairments. Concentrating its analysis on
the practical effect of the sequential evaluation process, the Court
observed that the Listing is used at the third step of the adult se-
quential evaluation process as an efficient way to find presumptive
disability for claimants with certain impairments and that the im-
pairments listed had to "prevent an adult, regardless of his age,
education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activ-
ity, not just 'substantial gainful activity.' ""'
Having found that the Listing was designed to produce only a
presumptive finding at an early stage in the determination process,
the Court went on to discuss four ways in which the three-step, list-
ings-only approach to child SSI disability determinations was more
restrictive than the five-step sequential evaluation process used for
adults and therefore ran against the statutory directive of "compa-
rable severity." The first flaw to which the Court pointed was that
the Listing does not cover all impairments that can result in a find-
ing of disability.12 Second, the Court noted that, even if a
claimant's condition is included in the Listing, the criteria estab-
lished for listed impairments are set at a higher level of severity
than the standard prescribed in the statute (any gainful activity, as
opposed to substantial gainful activity)."' The third problem the
Court found with a listings-only approach to disability determina-
tions focused on the lack of an individual assessment; any claimant
who suffers from an impairment that may not disable all persons
but does disable the individual claimant nonetheless is denied
109. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). A dissenting opinion by Justice White and
joined by the ChiefJustice is discussed briefly infra at text accompanying notes 118-19.
110. Zeb/ey, 493 U.S. at 529.
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benefits. The final shortcoming the Court noted was that the
"medical equivalence" option at Step 3 still required claimants with
unlisted impairments to fit all the criteria for a closely related,
listed impairment; claimants with more general indicators of dis-
ability that could meet the statutory requirement could not qualify
for benefits.'
1 4
In effect, the Court found that cutting off the sequential evalua-
tion process at Step 3, and thus precluding the use of something
like Steps 4 and 5 or their comparable equivalent, effectively de-
nied child SSI claimants the benefits of the statutory "comparable
severity" standard." 5 The Court thus acknowledged the unique role
that Step 3 plays in the full, five-step sequential evaluation process.
As noted earlier, Step 3 allows the Administration to make rela-
tively easy determinations of disability early in the process; the two
final steps serve to catch claimants who might qualify as unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity but do not meet the
stricter, any-gainful-activity requirement of the Listing of Impair-
ments. Since no set of listings could ensure that child claimants
would receive benefits when their impairments were of comparable
severity to impairments that would qualify for benefits as an adult,
an individual, functional analysis was required." 6 In rejecting the
argument that a vocational analysis of the type given adults
through an RFC assessment is inapplicable to children, the Court
stated, "[T] he fact that a vocational analysis is inapplicable to chil-
dren does not mean that a functional analysis cannot be applied to
them."" 7 Thus, the Court went well beyond voiding the three-step
sequential evaluation process for child's SSI benefits; it signaled
the inherent deficiency of any regulations that did not allow for
individual assessments of a child claimant's impairments.
The dissent saw the problem along the same lines as did most of
the lower courts, noting that comparing the child and adult evalua-
tion processes was like "comparing apples and oranges." Writing
for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White argued that,
since the severity of an impairment for an adult is measured by its
effects on the claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful ac-
tivity, or employment, that type of analysis is not useful in
114. Id.
115. One way this could be seen was where a claimant was denied benefits as a child but
granted benefits after turning eighteen, with the same impairment. See id. at 536 n.17 ("The
disparity in the Secretary's treatment of child and adult claimants is thrown into sharp relief
in cases where an unsuccessful child claimant, upon reaching age 18, is awarded benefits on
the basis of the same impairment deemed insufficient to qualify him for child disability bene-
fits." (citing Wills v. Sec'y of HHS, 686 F. Supp. 171, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1987)).
116. Zebley, 493 U.S. at539.
117. Id. at 539-40.
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adjudicating children's claims; therefore, the Social Security Ad-
ministration's decision to use a different disability determination
process for children was understandable and perhaps even un-
avoidable."" The solution, he said, was not to declare the
sequential evaluation regulations void on their face; rather, chil-
dren denied benefits at Step 3 should appeal the decision in
individual cases.11 9
C. Post-Zebley Regulations
The Supreme Court's decision in Zebley left little doubt that the
Social Security Administration would have to revise entirely the SSI
disability evaluation regulations for children. Not only had the
Court identified fundamental conflicts between the three-step se-
quential evaluation process and the statutory disability standard,
but the Court had also described the improvements it felt were
necessary to ensure that the disability determination process for
children would carry out the statutory directive of more closely re-
sembling the process for adults. In early 1991, one year after the
ZebLey was decided, the Social Security Administration issued final
regulations describing a new process for determining disability for
SSI claimants under the age of eighteen.2 °
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court, the Administration's
new regulations for child disability assessments closely followed the
format used to determine disability for adults. The new regulations
again centered on a sequential evaluation process; however, this
time, rather than simply cut the adult five-step process short along
118. See id. at 543 (White, J., dissenting) ("Given this task of comparing apples and or-
anges, it is understandable that the Secretary implemented the statute with respect to
children in a somewhat different manner than he did for adults, and surely there is no di-
rection in the statute to employ the same methodology for both groups.").
119. Id. at 545 ("[O]nly then can a court confidently say that the medically identifiable
impairment, though neither a listed impairment nor its equivalent, is nevertheless of 'com-
parable severity' and hence disabling when considered with nonmedical factors.").
120. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, 56 Fed. Reg. 5534 (Feb. 1, 1991) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416). SSA issued the
regulations initially in final form and not as a notice of proposed rulemaking, due to the
urgency of the need for final regulations to govern the post-Zebley process. For a thorough
description of the post-ZebLey regulations, see Julie Clark, Determining Disability for Children:
Implementation of Sullivan v. Zebley. Part I: The New Sequential Evaluation Process-An Overview,
25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 246 (1991);Julie Clark, Determining Disability for Children: Implemen-
tation of Sullivan v. Zebley. Part II: The Individualized Functional Assessment, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 494 (1991); Julie Clark, Determining Disability for Children: Implementation of Sullivan v.
Zebley. Part III: Medical and Functional Equivalence, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 979 (1991).
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the way, the Administration created a new four-step process for
children.12 The first three steps essentially tracked the first three
steps of the adult sequential evaluation process, although there
were some significant differences at Step 3. Step 4 was entirely new
and unique to child SSI claims. The new Step 4 also proved to be
highly controversial.
The first step was the same as that used for all types of disability
assessments and addressed the question whether the claimant was
engaged in substantial gainful activity.122 The regulations set out the
same definition of "substantial gainful activity" for both adult and
child claims: any work performed had to be both substantial,
meaning that it involved doing significant physical or mental activi-
ties, and gainful, meaning work done for pay or profit.' 23 Claimants
engaged in substantial gainful activity were not disabled; those not
engaged in substantial gainful activity proceeded to the next step.121
The second step was also taken from the adult sequential evalua-
tion process: a child's impairment, or combination of impairments,
had to be "severe" in order to move on to Step 3.25 Adapted slightly
to account for the fact that a child's limitations were not to be
measured according to work related activity, the critical question
was whether the child's impairment or combination of impair-
ments caused more than a minimal limitation in his or her ability
"to function in an age-appropriate manner.' , 126 The Administration
stressed that it was not its intention to deny benefits at this step to
children who might otherwise fit within the statutory definition but
rather to create a more efficient process. 12
The third step in the new sequential evaluation process for chil-
dren resembled both the third step of the five-step adult process
and what had been the final step of the process for children prior
to Zebley did the child's impairment meet or equal the require-
121. The new children's sequential evaluation process was codified at 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924 (1992).
122. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1992).
123. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)-(b) (1992).
124. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). SSA kept this step for child claims because, in its view, the
statutory definition of disability required it. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining
Disability for a Child Under Age 18, 56 Fed. Reg. 5534, 5537 (Feb. 1, 1991).
125. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d) (1992). The validity of the severity step in the adult deter-
mination process had already been upheld by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
126. 20 C.ER. § 416.924(d) (1992).
127. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, 56 Fed. Reg. 5534, 5538 (Feb. 1, 1991). SSA also stated that it added this requirement in
an effort to make the children's process more comparable to the adult process already in
place. Id. Step 2 of the adult process had come under attack earlier as an over-used basis for
denials. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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ments of a listed impairment as set out in the Administration's List-
ing of Impairments?2 ' However, the new equivalence analysis for
children differed in important respects from both the equivalence
analysis used for adult claimants and the pre-Zebley analysis used for
children.'2 Step 3 equivalence for adults had always been based
solely on medical evidence and it was kept that way in the adult
sequential evaluation process,3 0 but the Administration established
an entirely new method for determining equivalence for chil-
dren. 3' The new regulation still allowed for a showing of
equivalence based on medical evidence; however, if medical
equivalence was not found, then the regulations permitted a find-
ing of equivalence to a listed impairment "based on an assessment
of the child's overall functioning."0
32
In keeping with the spirit of the Zebley decision and the Supreme
Court's emphasis on the need for an individual, functional deter-
mination for children that mirrored the RFC analysis in the adult
determination process, the Social Security Administration stated
that "the primary focus [of new Step 3 equivalence determina-
tions] should be on the disabling consequences of an individual's
conditions, as long as there is a direct, medically determinable
cause for an individual's disability." 33 To effectuate this policy, the
new regulation stated that, in making a determination whether a
child's impairment equaled a listed impairment, the Administra-
tion would consider "all relevant evidence."1 3 4 The regulations also
included a list of examples of impairments that were functionally
equivalent to listed impairments.3 5 By emphasizing functional as-
sessments as well as medical evidence, the new regulations
responded to the Supreme Court's concern that the Listing does
128. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d) (1992).
129. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, 56 Fed. Reg. 5534, 5543-45 (Feb. 1, 1991). See generally Daniel L. Skoler, Evaluation of
Disability Benefits for Children: The Zebley Revolution, 14 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 8, 10 (Win-
ter-Spring 1993) (providing a brief analysis of the regulations following Zebley).
130. Thus, adult regulations provided that the SSA will "always base [the] decision
about whether [the claimant's] impairment(s) is medically equal to listed impairment on
medical evidence only" and that medical evidence had to be supported by "medical accept-
able clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926 (1992). Current
adult regulations are to the same effect. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526, 416.926 (2003).
131. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (1992).
132. Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18,
56 Fed. Reg. 5534, 5543 (Feb. 11, 1991). SSA noted that the new equivalence determination
method was based on three sources: the Zebley decision, the concept of "screening," and the
Listing of Impairments which contained examples of overall impairments of functioning. Id.
133. 56 Fed. Reg. at 5544.
134. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a) (1992).
135. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d) (1992).
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not include every possible disabling impairment and that a func-
tional analysis should be applied to children in lieu of the adult
vocational analysis. The Administration's intention was "to remove
any suggestion that the ultimate finding of equivalence must be
based on objective medical evidence alone""" though Step 3 still
remained closely tied to the Listing of Impairments.
Most importantly, therefore, the new sequential evaluation
process for children did not end at Step 3. If, notwithstanding the
more liberal concept of medical or functional equivalence, a child
claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impair-
ments that met or equaled a listed impairment, the process
continued to a fourth and final step that was analogous to the
Steps 4 & 5 assessment for adults: an individualized functional as-
sessment (IFA) based on the child's ability to function
"independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-
appropriate manner." 37 By introducing an IFA separate from the
work activity-based RFC, the Administration effectively acknowl-
edged the Supreme Court's observation in Zebley that "[t]he fact
that a vocational analysis is inapplicable to children does not mean
that a functional analysis cannot be applied to them.""3s
The goal of the new Step 4 IFA was to evaluate whether a child
claimant had an impairment or combination of impairments that
was of comparable severity to an impairment that would prevent an
adult from engaging in substantial gainful activity; in other words,
whether the child met the "comparable severity" disability standard
of the Act. Because this analysis necessarily is complex, the Admini-
stration provided detailed guidelines on IFA analysis in the
regulations. 39 A detailed discussion of the rules is not necessary for
the purposes of this article, especially since, as noted below, they
have been repealed. However, some description of their complex-
ity will help put their repeal in context.1
40
136. Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18,
56 Fed. Reg. 5534, 5545 (Feb. 11, 1991).
137. 56 Fed. Reg. at 5537, 5538-40. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(f) (1992).
138. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 539-40 (1990). The separate approaches utilized
in order to reach a determination for children and adults is addressed directly in Hall v.
Chater, 894 E Supp. 968 (W.D. Va. 1995). In Hall the court noted that the use of a vocational
expert or a Medical Assessment to do a Work test was inappropriate when determining dis-
ability for a child claimant. See 894 F. Supp. at 972-73. But see Ware v. Shalala, 902 F. Supp.
1262, 1273-74 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (finding that where the claimant was over sixteen, a voca-
tional expert was needed because the regulations relate disability determinations for older
adolescents to ability to function in a work-like setting).
139. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924(a)-(e) (1992).
140. For an early assessment of 7Zeblzy and the Social Security Administration's response,
see Weishaupt & Rains, supra note 12. See generally Clark, supra note 20 (Part II).
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The basic guideline for determining disability through an IFA
was the child's ability to function at an "age-appropriate" level. In
order to keep IFA determinations within a framework that would
result in some degree of uniformity, the regulations divided claim-
ants by age and then used "domains" of either development or
functioning (depending on the claimant's age) to determine dis-
ability.4' The regulations divided children into three age groups:
newborn and young infants (from birth to age one); older infants
(from ages one to three); and children (between the ages of three
and eighteen). 42 The "children" category was subdivided further
into four categories: preschool children (from ages three to six);
school-age children (from ages six to twelve); young adolescents
(from ages twelve to sixteen); and older adolescents (from ages
sixteen to eighteen) .43 In practice, then, there were really six age
categories, which the Administration stated it would "not apply...
mechanically in borderline situations.0
44
After the age of the claimant had been established, she or he
was then assessed with regard to the "domains" set forth in the
regulations."5 The regulations listed seven separate domains, some
of which were limited to certain age groups: cognition, communi-
cation, motor abilities, social abilities, responsiveness to stimuli
(for children from birth to age one), personal/behavioral patterns
(for children from ages one to eighteen), and concentration, per-
sistence, and pace in task completion (for children from ages three
to eighteen) .46 After the list of domains, the regulations described
the general kinds of age-related activities that could be affected by
an impairment for each age group and each domain.1
47
In order to be found disabled at Step 4, the claimant's IFA would
have to demonstrate either a moderate impairment in one domain
and a marked impairment in another, or a moderate impairment
in three domains. 148 For children approaching adulthood, those
141. Generally, the domains for claimants under the age of seven were referred to as
"developmental" domains; from the age of seven to the age of eighteen, they were referred
to as "functional domains." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(c) (4) (1992).
142. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924b(b) (1992).
143. 20 C.ER. § 416.924(b) (3) (1992).
144. Id. The child's age was generally based on birth date, but adjustments were possi-
ble for children born prematurely. See 20 C.ER. § 416.924b(b) (1992).
145. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.924c(a) (2) (1992).
146. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924c(a)(2) (1992).
147. See20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924c(b)-(g) (1992).
148. 20 C.FR. §§ 416.924e(c)(1)-(2) (1992). Even if it was determined that a child did
suffer from an impairment or combination of impairments that met one of these two crite-
ria, it did not automatically qualify him or her for disability benefits; it was merely a general
guideline. Id.
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between sixteen and eighteen, the regulations set up a more indi-
vidualized structure that "evaluated in terms that are the same as,
or similar to, those used for the evaluation of the youngest
adults."1 49 The IFA for children between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen thus took on a more vocational-oriented focus than the
determination for younger children. 50 The regulations also dis-
cussed the nature of the evaluation of mental and physical
functions, which looked at the claimant's ability to function in a
work-like environment and perform tasks such as following instruc-
tions, using judgment, sitting, standing, and lifting. 5' If, after
completing an IFA, the Administration determined that the claim-
ant's impairment or combination of impairments seriously
interfered with his or her ability to function independently, appro-
priately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner, the claimant
would be found disabled. 152 If a claimant was found not disabled,
the adjudicator had to state exactly how and why that decision was
reached.
5 3
By any measure, these regulations were a full and generous fol-
low up to the Supreme Court's Zebley decision. Having been
upbraided for selling short the "comparable severity" standard with
the three-step sequential evaluation regulations, the Social Security
Administration responded by opening up to child SSI claimants.
Still operating with only limited guidance as to which "disabled"
children Congress intended to include in the child's SSI program,
the Administration corrected its obvious mistake of having im-
ported the overly restrictive dependent spouse sequential
evaluation process. However, the new four-step process-and, in
particular, individual functional assessments called for at Step 4-
proved to be extremely vulnerable to criticism from the other end.
149. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(d)(1) (1992).
150. See Ware v. Shalala, 902 F. Supp. 1262, 1273 (E.D. Wash. 1995) ("[W]hile the ra-
tionale for not employing steps four and five of the adult process (a vocational analysis) is
valid for determining a child's disability when that child is under the age of 16, that ration-
ale disappears when evaluating the disability of an adolescent, aged 16 to 18.").
151. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(d)(2)-(3) (1992).
152. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a (1992).
153. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1453(a) (1992). This explanation requirement was the subject of
substantial amounts of litigation. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Chater, 911 F. Supp. 98, 102 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) ("A court 'cannot... conduct a review that is both limited and meaningful if the ALJ
does not state with sufficient clarity the legal rules being applied and the weight accorded
the evidence considered.'" (quoting Ryan v. Heckler, 762 E2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1985)));
Miller v. Chater, 929 E Supp. 95, 101 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he ALJ's failure to detail his
adherence to the regulations, or to otherwise explain his determination of plaintiff's limita-
tions in the social domain as 'less than moderate,' constitutes error.").
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IV. THE FALL OF ZEBLEYAND A RETURN TO THE PAST
The combination of the Supreme Court's decision in Zebley and
the Social Security Administration's new regulations implementing
that decision had a dramatic impact on the effective disability
standard for child SSI benefits. Congress was not prepared for the
resulting expansion of the SSI rolls and responded by repealing
the "comparable severity" standard, substituting a new disability
standard for children, and directing the Social Security Admini-
stration to rewrite its regulations once again. This section reviews
the Congressional reaction to Zebley and the Social Security Ad-
ministration's post-Zebley regulations, including 1996 amendments
to the Social Security Act, and then describes the current SSI dis-
ability regulations for children implementing those amendments.
It concludes with a critique of the current regulations, which
revert back to a modified three-step sequential evaluation process,
as having failed to learn from their pre- and post-Zebley past.
A. Reaction to Zebley and the post-Zebley Regulations:
1996 Amendments to the Social Security Act
The liberalization of the disability standard for child SSI claims
brought about by the Social Security Administration's Supreme
Court-ordered revisions of the sequential evaluation process did
not go unnoticed in Congress, where concerns with the level of
expenditures on the program began to mount soon after the Zebley
decision was announced. 54 Between 1989-the year before Zebley
was decided-and 1994, the cost of the child's SSI program more
than tripled from $1.2 billion to $4 billion, prompting the House
Committee on Ways and Means to declare that the program was
"out of control.',' 15 During that same time, Congress directed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to appoint a bi-
partisan commission-what became the National Commission on
154. Thus, in a 1992 oversight report, the Human Resources Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Ways and Means noted that the Social Security Administration was
expecting to add 125,000 blind or disabled children to the SSI rolls by the end of fiscal year
1992, as a direct result of the Zeb/ey case. H.R. REP. No. 102-431, at 85 (1992).
155. H.R. REP. No. 104-81, pt. 1, at 49 (1995), 1995 WL 374459 (Leg. Hist.). The num-
ber of children receiving SSI benefits grew from about 300,000 in 1959 to about 900,000 in
1994. Id.
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Childhood Disability-to study, among other things, the effect of
the then-current definition of disability for children under 18.'15
The strongest criticism focused specifically on the new individu-
alized functional assessments included at Step 4 of the child
sequential evaluation process.157 At one level, Step 4 and its IFAs
were seen as setting an overly permissive standard for eligibility;
going beyond the Listing of Impairments and measuring func-
tional limitations individually allowed less than fully disabled
children to receive benefits. 5 8  Although this view persisted
throughout the relevant period of Congressional activity, it re-
mained in the background of the debate-perhaps because no
direct link between the growth of the child's SSI program rolls and
the use of IFAs was ever shown. "9
156. The Commission was charged with studying the effect of the then-current defini-
tion of disability for children under 18, federal health care, vouchers, rehabilitation, trusts,
and the effects of the SS1 program on families. See Pub. L. No. 103-296 § 202, 108 Stat. 1464
(1994). Pursuant to that authority, the National Commission on Childhood Disability issued
its report in 1995. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11. The year before, the
Chairs of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Social Security Subcommittee
of the Committee on Ways and Means had asked the private National Academy of Social
Insurance (NASI) to review the Social Security disability programs, including SSI; in light of
the pace of legislative developments relative to the child's SSI program, the NASI study
group issued a report of its own focusing on that program-first as a preliminary report in
1995,and then in its final form in 1996. See RESTRUCTURING THE SSI DISABILITY PROGRAM
FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD DISABILITY
OF THE DISABILITY POLICY PANEL V (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RE-
STRUCTURING SSI].
157. See S. REP. No. 104-96, at 50 (1995), 1995 WL 351655 (Leg. Hist.) (noting that
proposed legislation "would eliminate childhood IFAs and their statutory underpinning, the
'comparable severity' rule, as a b, 's for [finding disability]. Many children on the rolls as a
result of an IFA (roughly a quarter of children now on SSI) would be terminated, and future
awards based on an IFA would be barred."). There was also a more general concern that the
program's true intent was being lost in an overbroad definition of disability. See H.R. REP.
No. 104-725, at 328, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2716. See also NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 11, at 55. At the same time, the concern of some scholars when
children were first added to the SSI program was that the disability standard would exclude
those who most needed assistance. SeeJameson & King, supra note 12, at 316.
158. As explained by the House Committee on Ways and Means in support of its version
of legislation that would eventually repeal Step 4, "[c]hildren receiving monthly checks
based on an individualized functional assessment are ... the least disabled SSI recipients."
H.R. REP. No. 104-81, pt. 1 at 49 (1995), 1995 WL 374459 (Leg. Hist.). Similarly, the Senate
Committee on Finance called the IFA "a misnomer" and noted: "[Iln reality the IFA is a set
of regulations that permits individuals with modest conditions or impairments to be eligible
for this program." S. REP. No. 104-96, at 18 (1995), 1995 WL 351655 (Leg. Hist.). The same
idea was expressed without direct reference to IFAs, blaming the problem of excessive
growth on "generally broadened eligibility criteria" brought about by the post-ZebLey regula-
tions. H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1386 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2445.
159. Thus, the GAO reported a similar rise in numbers through the end of 1992 but
concluded that "most of the children who received new awards would have qualified for
them even without the functional assessment process mandated by the Zeb/ey decision." See
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WAs and their focus on age-appropriate behavior were more
strongly criticized as being subject to abuse. A common and widely
publicized charge was that parents were "coaching" their children
to act out and under-perform in school in order to qualify as dis-
abled 6° Dissatisfaction with evaluation of children's mental
impairments was tied to this concern as well.'" Although docu-
mented cases were rare,6 2 the coaching charge stuck. As noted by
the National Commission on Childhood disability, which itself had
examined these charges and found that coaching children was not
a significant factor in the child SSI disability determination proc-
ess, "[T]he news media has continued to report allegations of
coaching. Such coverage has fueled Congressional interest and
heightened public concern that fraud may constitute a major
source of program growth.""3 In the House Committee on the
Budget's report on the bill, for example, the amendments were
US GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: RAPID RISE IN CHILDREN ON SSI Dis-
ABILITY ROLLS FOLLOWING NEW REGULATIONS GAO/HEHS-94-225 2 (1994).
160. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. E2773 (1992) ("Doctors are reporting that parents are
asking them to put their children on the drug Ritalyn, because the parents have learned that
a prescription for this drug is treated by the Social Security Administration as a criterion for
automatic entitlement to supplemental security income checks. Claims based on such crite-
ria as these go unchallenged almost as a matter of routine." (Statement of Rep. Paul B.
Henry)).
161. See H.R. REP. No. 104-81, at 373 (1995), 1995 WL 374459 (Leg. Hist.) ("Eliminat-
ing 'maladaptive behavior' from the so-called 'domains' on which benefits may be based
would eliminate the possibility of children receiving benefits because parents have coached
them to misbehave.",).
162. For example, the GAO examined two initiatives by the SSA designed to uncover
this type of abuse and concluded that both initiatives "identified few cases of suspected
coaching and very few of the children involved received SSI benefits." US GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, SSA INITIATIVES TO IDENTIFY COACHING, GAO/HEHS-96-96R 2 (1996)
(report to Rep. Blanche Lambert Lincoln). See also RESTRUCTURING SSI, supra note 156, at 2
(report by independent National Academy of Social Insurance): "Any evidence of such
coaching or 'gaming the system' is extraordinarily thin-and appears to be based on anec-
dotes or perceptions of dubious benefit claims, which upon investigation are found to have
been denied."
163. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 23 (report to Congress of the
National Commission on Childhood Disability). As examples, the Commission cited several
newspaper accounts. Id. at 23 n.37. See also H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 261 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649 ("eliminating incentives for coaching children to misbehave so they
can qualify for benefits" listed as rationale for repeal of post-Zebley regulations); H.R. REP.
No. 104-651, at 1386 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2445 ("The committee
received extensive testimony about the inducement that cash payments present to some
poor families with children who are not severely disabled. Particularly troubling are reports
of 'coaching' on the part of parents .. ."). See generally Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E.
Roberts, Poverty, Welfae Reform, and the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 454-55
(2001). On the merits of the charges, the Commission concluded that available data "sug-
gests strongly that coaching is not a significant cause of growth in the SSI program."
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 24.
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justified, in part, because children exhibiting "age-inappropriate"
behavior was "particularly prone to abuse.',
6 4
All of this prompted Congress to amend the SS disability stan-
dard for children as part of its major overhaul of welfare laws in
1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act (PRWORA) changed both the statutory definition of
disability for children and the four-step sequential evaluation proc-
ess that had been put in place following Zebley. 16 5 The new
legislation repealed the "comparable severity" standard and re-
placed it with a child-specific standard that provides: "An
individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled ... if
that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limita-
tions.'' 166 PRWORA also directed the Social Security Administration
to remove IFAs from the sequential evaluation process 167 and to
modify specified sections of the Listing of Impairments to elimi-
nate references to maladaptive behavior in the domain of
personal/behavioral function.6 8 As explained in the conference
report, "The conferees intend that only needy children with severe
disabilities be eligible for SSI, and the Listing of Impairments and
other current disability determination regulations as modified by
164. H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1323 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2382.
See also id. (amendments intended "to better target benefits for children who are disabled
and also to combat abuse of the SSI program").
165. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211-212, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188-92 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (C) (2000)). PRWORA was most visible and controversial for its repeal
of AFDC. See, e.g., GregJ. Duncan & Gretchen Caspary, Welfare Dynamics and the 1996 Welfare
Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 605, 611 (1997) (critique of post-AFDC
TANF program for failure to account for "heterogeneity" of the welfare experience). Also,
POWORA's revision of the SSI child's disability standard has had an impact well beyond the
SSI cash benefit program. See Sara Rosenbaum & Kathleen A. Maloy, The Law of Unintended
Consequences: The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Its
Impact on Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1999); Linda C. Fenti-
man, Health Care Access for Children with Disabilities, 19 PACE L. REv. 245, 269-73 (1999).
166. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2188 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (2000)). Child SSI claimants must also meet the traditional duration
requirement-their impairments must have lasted or be expected to last at least 12
months-and they cannot be engaging in substantial gainful activity. Id.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a) (3) (C) (ii) (2000) ("Notwithstanding clause (i), no individual under the age of 18
who engages in substantial gainful activity.., may be considered to be disabled.").
167. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 211(b) (1), (2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2189 (removing 20
C.ER. §§ 416.924d, 416.924e (1992)).
168. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211(d) (I) (A) (ii), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (modifying 20
C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx I (Listings) §§ 112.00(C) (2), 112.02(B) (2) (c) (2) (1996)).
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these provisions properly reflect the severity of disability contem-
plated by the new statutory definition.""'
The conference report also provided some specific directions
for evaluating domains of functioning in the Listing of Impair-
ments: "In those areas of the Listing that involve domains of
functioning, the conferees expect no less than two marked limita-
tions as the standard for qualification." 70 At the same time, the
conferees also made it clear-consistent with the statement quoted
above to the effect that the Listing of Impairments, together with
"other current disability determination regulations," should be
used to assure that the level of severity required for eligibility
matches the new statutory standard-that the Listing was not nec-
essarily the exclusive means for evaluating disability for children.
After noting that the Zebley Court had found that the Social Secu-
rity Administration had been "remiss" in following the statutory
directive that the effect of combined impairments be considered in
evaluating disability, the report continued, "The conferees also ex-
pect SSA to continue to use criteria in its Listing of Impairments
and in the application of other determination procedures, such as
functional equivalence, to ensure that young children, especially
children too young to be tested, are properly considered for eligi-
bility of benefits.'
71
Clearly, the new "marked and severe functional limitations"
standard was intended to be more stringent than the "comparable
severity" standard that it replaced. Moreover, Congress was explicit
in its disapproval of IFAs and certain details of the Listing of Im-
pairments. The post-Zebley four-step sequential evaluation process
had to go and, although Congress did not go this far, ordering the
Social Security Administration to break completely from the se-
quential evaluation process model would have been a good thing.
The original three-step process imported from the dependent
spouse program was a disaster, resulting in all the difficulties and
costs associated with the Supreme Court's intervention in Zebley,
169. H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 328 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2716.
The House report contained similar language. See H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1385 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2444.
170. Id.
171. H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 328 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2716. See
also id. ("[T]he conferees expect that SSA will properly observe the requirements of [42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(G)] and ensure that the combined effects of all the physical or mental
impairments of an individual under age 18 are taken into account in making a determina-
tion regarding eligibility under the definition of disability. The conferees note that the 1990
Supreme Court decision in 7ebley established that SSA had been previously remiss in this
regard.").
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and the post-Zebley effort to create the equivalent of the adult Steps
4 and 5 for children through IFAs brought on the heat that drove
the reactionary 1996 amendments. At the same time, some pro-
gress had been made: for the first time, Congress set out a
disability standard uniquely for children. Had the Social Security
Administration chosen to implement the new "marked and severe
functional limitations" standard from scratch, it could have created
a truly child-centered approach to disability determination. In-
stead, the Administration reached backward and resuscitated the
three-step sequential evaluation process, complete with its un-
avoidable pre-Zebley baggage.
B. Back to the Future: Implementing the 1996
Amendments with a "New" Three-Step Process
The Social Security Administration implemented the 1996
amendments with interim final regulations in 1997, followed by
final regulations in 2000.172 The Administration certainly under-
stood its broad mission; in its introduction to the interim final
regulations, the Administration noted that, "[u]nder the new law, a
child's impairment or combination of impairments must cause
more serious impairment-related limitations than the old law and
our prior regulations required.
1 73
Having seen Congress remove Step 4 and its IFAs from the child
sequential evaluation process, it was easy for the Social Security
Administration to stick with sequential evaluation logic and con-
clude that, in order to satisfy the new "marked and severe
172. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, 62 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Feb. 11, 1997); Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disabil-
ity for a Child Under Age 18, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,747 (Sept. 11, 2000). The final regulations
included substantial changes in the methods for evaluating functional limitations. Instead of
the six domains listed in the current regulation, there were five developmental categories:
cognition/communication; motor; social; personal; and concentration, persistence, and
pace. See 20 C.F.R. 416.926(c) (4) (2000); Harris v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (N.D.
111. 2002). The goal of this change was to provide a more accurate assessment of the child's
limitations. 65 Fed. Reg. at 54,759. However, the definitions and required test results for
"marked" and "extreme" limitations-in effect, the standard for eligibility-remained the
same. See id. at 54,756; Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1238 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The
amendments mark a major change in the evaluation process employed.., in child disability
cases and provide a single method of evaluation based only on domains of functioning....
The definitions and testing results for marked and extreme disabilities, however, have not
changed."); Hicks v. Barnhart, 2002 WL 377709 (N.D. 111. 2002) ("Both parties agree that
the basic standard for determining functional equivalence remains unchanged from the
interim rules.").
173. 62 Fed. Reg. at 6409.
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functional limitations" requirement, a claimant under the age of
eighteen would have to meet or equal the requirements of a listed
impairment-precisely the requirement prior to Zebley. The Ad-
ministration knew that it could not revert exactly to the pre-
Zebley approach since Congress had made it clear that functional
limitations should remain important in evaluating child disability
claims. 174 Indeed, the preamble to the new regulations specifically
acknowledged this holdover from the post-Zebley era, "[E]ven
though it eliminated the IFA, Congress directed us to continue to
evaluate a child's functional limitations where appropriate, albeit
using a higher level of severity than under the former IFA.
17
1
Nonetheless, the Administration stated its charge of translating the
new statutory standard into operational regulations in familiar
three-step sequential evaluation terms: "IT] he term marked and se-
vere functional limitations ... is a level of severity that meets or
medically or functionally equals the requirements of a listing."
176
The current regulations require the adjudicator to "follow a set
order" in determining whether a child is disabled.1 77 That set order
amounts to, in effect, the first three steps of a traditional three- or
five-step sequential evaluation process:
If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will determine
that you are not disabled and not review your claim further. If
you are not doing substantial gainful activity, we will consider
your physical or mental impairment(s) first to see if you have
an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe.
If your impairment(s) is not severe, we will determine that
you are not disabled and not review your claim further. If your
impairment(s) is severe, we will review your claim further to
see if you have an impairment(s) that meets, medically equals,
or functionally equals the listings. If you have such an im-
pairment(s), and it meets the duration requirement, we will
find that you are disabled. If you do not have such an im-
pairment(s), or if it does not meet the duration requirement,
we will find that you are not disabled.
17 8
174. See H.R. REP,. No. 104-725, at 328 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2716
("Where appropriate, the conferees remind SSA of the importance of the use of functional
equivalence disability determination procedures."). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1385
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2444.
175. 62 Fed. Reg. at 6413.
176. 62 Fed. Reg. at 6410.
177. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (2003).
178. Id.
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Each step is then explained further:
If you are working and the work you are doing is substantial
gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regard-




If you do not have a medically determinable impairment, or
your impairment(s) is a slight abnormality or a combination
of slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal
functional limitations, we will find that you do not have a se-
vere impairment(s) and are, therefore, not disabled. 80
An impairment(s) causes marked and severe functional limi-
tations if it meets or medically equals the severity of a set of
criteria for an impairment in the listings, or if it functionally
equals the listings.
(1) Therefore, if you have an impairment(s) that meets or
medically equals the requirements of a listing or that func-
tionally equals the listings, and that meets the duration
requirement, we will find you disabled.
(2) If your impairment(s) does not meet the duration re-
quirement, or does not meet, medically equal, or functionally
equal the listings, we will find that you are not disabled.""'
The first step-required by explicit mention in the Social Secu-
rity Act, added together with the new disability standard, that
children engaging in substantial gainful activity are not dis-
abled_8 2-incorporates the work-centered criteria used in Step I of
the five-step sequential evaluation process for adult disability de-
terminations. The second step is essentially the same as Step 2 of
the five-step sequential evaluation process, except that it includes a
reference to functional limitations. In this respect, it is similar to
Step 2 of the post-Zebley four-step process. The new third step looks
to whether a child's impairment meets or equals a listed impair-
ment, again, tracking the adult Step 3, but then specifies two types
of equivalence: proof of an impairment or combination of im-
179. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b) (2003).
180. 20 C.ER. § 416.924(c) (2003).
181. 20 C.ER. § 416.924(d) (2003).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(ii) (2000) ("[N]o individual under the age of 18
who engages in substantial gainful activity... may be considered to be disabled.").
Three Steps and You're Out
pairments that "medically equals the severity of a set of criteria for




The "functional equivalence" option at Step 3 is also reminiscent
of the post-Zebley regulations; however, functional equivalence plays
a more important role in the current regulations. As the final ex-
tension of a terminal Step 3, it ties the current three-step process to
the amended statutory standard and, as a result, is the key to its
uniqueness. A separate regulation dedicated exclusively to func-
tional equivalence sets the standard for a finding of functional
equivalence and thus the effective meaning of the new "marked
and severe functional limitations" language in the statute. "By
'functionally equal the listings,' we mean that your impairment(s)
must be of listing-level severity; i.e., it must result in 'marked' limi-
tations in two domains of functioning or an 'extreme' limitation in
one domain. 18 4 The regulation specifies six domains of function-
ing: acquiring and using information; attending and completing
tasks; interacting and relating with others; moving about and ma-
nipulating objects; caring for themselves; and health and physical
well-being. 8 5 These domains are "broad areas of functioning in-
tended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do'' . and are
described in great detail in the regulation, with examples.11
7
The functional equivalence regulation defines a marked limita-
tion as one that interferes seriously with the child's "ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." l8 Placing it
between "moderate" and "extreme," a marked limitation "is the
equivalent of the functioning [one] would expect to find on stan-
dardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than three,
standard deviations below the mean."8 9 An extreme limitation is de-
fined as one that "interferes very seriously with [the child's] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities."' 90 It can be
shown by a valid score on a standardized test that is three or more
183. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d) (2003).
184. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a) (2003).
185. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi) (2003).
186. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1) (2003).
187. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)-(1) (2003).
188. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e) (2) (i) (2003).
189. Id. For children under the age of 3 without standard scores from standardized
tests, a "marked" limitation means a level of functioning "that is more than one-half but not
more than two-thirds of [the child's] chronological age." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e) (2) (ii)
(2003).
190. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e) (3) (i) (2003).
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standard deviations below the mean. 'q' The adjudicator is directed
to assess the "interactive and cumulative effects" of all of a child's
impairments and to consider all relevant factors that affect a child's
functional limitations, including how well the child initiates and
sustains activities, how much extra help he or she needs, the effects
of structured or supportive settings, how the child functions in
school, and how the child is affected by his or her medications or
other treatment. 192 The regulation then provides that the adjudica-
tor will look at all of the information in the record, including what
the child does at home, at school, and in the community, in order
to determine "how appropriately, effectively, and independently"
the child performs compared to other children of the same age.193
In effect, these regulations do two things: they tie the level of se-
verity required to show functional equivalence to the Listing of
Impairments-listing-level severity-and they explain that listing-
level severity for these purposes means either one "extreme" or two
"marked" limitations of functioning in the prescribed domains.
Exactly how the "one extreme or two marked limitations" standard
will work and whether it will allow for full and fair assessments of
functional equivalence (or, more importantly, whether it will allow
children to prove that the meet the statutory standard of "marked
and severe functional limitations") remains to be seen. Some ques-
tions have been raised already in the courts 194 and in the
literature,' 5 but assuming that the regulations-with their exten-
sive categorizations, examples, and use of recognized measures-
will stand, adjudicators will have to look at conflicting evidence
from a variety of sources in order to determine whether a child has
the required number of "extreme" or "marked" limitations of func-
tioning. It is at this point, and particularly with the closest cases,
191. Id.
192. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a)(1)-(3) (2003) ("We will assess the functional limita-
tions caused by your impairment(s); i.e., what you cannot do, have difficulty doing, need
help doing, or are restricted from doing because of your impairment(s). When we make a
finding regarding functional equivalence, we will assess the interactive and cumulative ef-
fects of all of the impairments for which we have evidence, including any impairments you
have that are not 'severe.' When we assess your functional limitations, we will consider all
the relevant factors in [related regulations] including, but not limited to: (1) How well you
can initiate and sustain activities, how much extra help you need, and the effects of struc-
tured or supportive settings; (2) How you function in school; and (3) The effects of your
medications or other treatment.").
193. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b) (2003).
194. The regulation's failure to consider less than marked limitations was challenged
recently unsuccessfully, with the court deferring to the Administration and its congression-
ally delegated rulemaking power. See Encarnacion v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 78, 86-89 (2d Cir.
2003).
195. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 12.
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that the three-step sequential evaluation process of the current
regulatory scheme can be misunderstood and misused.
C. The Problem of a Three-Step Overlay
on the Current Regulations
As shown earlier, a shortened, three-step version of the sequen-
tial evaluation process has been misused in the past, especially in
the child's SSI program during the period prior to Zebley. While the
Social Security Administration may have had some justification for
so limiting the disability determination process for disabled
spouses, reasoning that the strict pre-1991 "any gainful activity"
statutory standard for dependent spouse claims matched the medi-
cal-only "any gainful activity" standard of the Listing of
Impairments,196 its recent return to a three-step process for child
SSI claims is confusing and destructive to the aim of effectively im-
plementing the Congressional policy of providing benefits to
needy children with disabilities. The seeds of this confusion can be
seen in the current regulations themselves and it appears to have
been picked up in the cases reviewing the first denials under those
regulations.
Although the words do not appear in the regulations, the Social
Security Administration specifically retained the "sequential
evaluation process" terminology in explaining how post-1996 child
SSI disability determinations should proceed.9 Similarly, many
current cases refer to child SSI disability determinations as a three-
step sequential evaluation process or some variant of that term.'98
196. A number of courts saw this differently, however. See supra text accompanying notes
92-97.
197. Thus, the Administration explained that it established "a new sequential evaluation
process" following the 1996 amendments. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining
Disability for a Child Under Age 18, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,747, 54,748 (Sept. 11, 2000).
198. See, e.g., Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A three-step proc-
ess is employed to decide whether a child is disabled."); Mancuso v. Barnhart, No. 02-2088,
2002 WL 31656558, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 2002) (unpublished) (post-1996 regulations "ar-
ticulated a new three-step sequential evaluation process");Jefferson v. Barnhart, 209 F. Supp.
2d 1200, 1202 (N.D. Okla. 2002) ("Through regulations, the Commissioner has adopted a
three-step sequential analysis to determine whether a child is disabled."); Beliveau v. Apfel,
154 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (D. Mass. 2001) ("In determining whether a child is eligible for SSI
benefits on the basis of disability, a three-step evaluation process is followed."); Smith v.
Massanari, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner establish a three-step sequential evaluation process to be followed in a child
disability case."); Roelandt v. Apfel, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145-46 (S.D. Iowa 2001) ("20
C.F.R. § 416.924(a) sets out a three step sequential evaluation process for childhood
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There is nothing inherently wrong with this, as the current regula-
tions do indeed set out, in effect, a three-step process.""9 There is a
danger, however, if the current process-in particular, Step 3 of the
current process-is equated with three-step sequential evaluations
of the past. A clear example of this is a recent case in which the
court saw the effect of the 1996 amendments as simply removing
the fourth step of the post-Zebley sequential evaluation process:
"The 1996 legislation truncated the sequential analysis by cutting
off the fourth step, so that if the child's impairment failed to meet
or equal one of the Listings, the child would be conclusively ad-
judged not disabled."2  After quoting the new "marked and severe
functional limitations" standard now in the Social Security Act, the
court concluded, "The regulations promulgated following the 1996
statute preserved the first three steps in the sequential analysis,
which continued to reflect properly the statutory language ...
coupled with the proviso ... that no child engaged in substantial
gainful activity may be considered disabled.
201
Do the current regulations prescribe a "new" sequential evalua-
tion process-one that aims specifically at the new "marked and
severe functional limitations" disability standard for children-or do
they signal a return to the pre-Zebley past? Unfortunately, the current
regulations do not provide a clear answer. At one level, they are sim-
ple and clear: in order to qualify for SSI benefits, a child cannot be
working and must have a severe impairment (or combination of im-
pairments) that meets or equals the criteria set forth in the Listing
of Impairments. Most children under the age of 18 do not work,
even without disabilities, and the threshold "severe" impairment re-
quirement is minimal; therefore, the key to eligibility is that child
claimants must either meet or equal the requirements of the Listing
disability claims."). The Seventh Circuit's formulation of the process in Brindisi is typical.
"First, if the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity, his or her claim is denied. Sec-
ond, if the child does not have a medically determinable 'severe' impairment or
combination of impairments, then his or her claim is denied. Finally, for a child to be con-
sidered disabled, the child's impairment(s) must meet, medically equal, or functionally
equal the requirements of a listed impairment in [the Listing of Impairments]." 315 F.3d at
785 (citations omitted).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
200. Fontanez v. Barnhart, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1348 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
201. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)). See also Hart -.v Chater, 963 F. Supp. 835, 839-40
(W.D. Mo. 1997) ("Now, under the new law, there are only three steps in the sequential
analysis for a child seeking SSI disability benefits, effectively returning the Commissioner's
process for evaluating disability in children to that employed prior to 1990 when the Su-
preme Court decided Sullivan v. Zebley. With the statutory abolition of the comparable
severity standard, the Commissioner's three-step procedure for the evaluation of childhood
disability for SSI now meets the statutory requirements, in contrast to the pre-Zebey period.
Consequently, tinder the new law, the analysis ends at step three with the determination of
whether the child's impairments meet or equal any of the listed impairments.").
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in order to qualify for benefits. The regulations lose their clarity,
however, where they go on to provide that a child can meet the re-
quirements of the listing by showing either "medical equivalence" or
"functional equivalence." Is there a substantial difference-not just a
difference in the type of evidence considered-between medical
equivalence, a familiar option at Step 3 of the sequential evaluation
process, and functional equivalence, the new component that dis-
tinguishes the current Step 3 from its predecessors? If so (or if not),
how does one (or the other, or both) relate to the new disability
standard for children in the Social Security Act?
The place to begin is the general definitions regulation, which
states,
When we refer to an impairment(s) that 'meets, medically
equals, or functionally equals the listings,' we mean that the
impairment(s) meets or medically equals the severity of any list-
ing in [the Listing of Impairments] ... or that it functionally
equals the severity of the listings, as explained in [a separate
regulation on functional equivalence] .2o2
The functional equivalence regulation, in turn, explains, "By
'functionally equal the listings,' we mean that your impairment(s)
must be of listing-level severity; i.e., it must result in 'marked' limita-
tions in two domains of functioning or an 'extreme' limitation in
one domain." 20 3 This seems to indicate that "listing-level severity"
means a showing of either a "marked" limitation in two domains of
functioning or an "extreme" limitation in one; in other words, the
Administration set the two "marked" or one "extreme" limitation
standard for functional equivalence as a proxy for listing-level sever-
ity. It should be noted here that the difference between matching
proof of medical equivalence against "the severity of any listine' and
matching proof of functional equivalence against "the severity of the
listings' signals that a child's functional limitations do not have to
match the severity requirements of any particular listing. °4 That
202. 20 C.F.R. § 416.902 (2003) (cross-referencing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a)).
203. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a) (2003).
204. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child Under Age
18, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,747, 54,757 (Sept. 11, 2000) (noting, in relation to revised 20 C.ER.
§416.926(a)(d) on functional equivalence, "[W]e provide explicitly that we will not
compare a child's functioning to the requirements of any specific listing to underscore that
we are delinking the policy from direct reference to the listings.").
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distinction does not, however, result in a difference in the level of
severity required. 5
So "functional equivalence" means "'marked' limitations in two
domains of functioning or an 'extreme' limitation in one domain,"
which amounts to "listing-level severity." At the same time, we know
what listing-level severity means: the level of severity represented by
the criteria set out for the various impairments included in the
Listing of Impairments, which has always been set at the extra-high
standard of "inability to engage in any gainful activity."20 6 Since the
Administration cannot say that in this context-if it did, the new
functional equivalence option for children would add nothing to a
traditional Step 3 analysis-the current Listing regulations explain
further, "The Listing of Impairments describes, for each of the ma-
jor body systems, impairments that are considered severe enough
to prevent an adult from doing any gainful activity or, for a child,
that causes marked and severe functional limitations., 20 7 In other
words, listing-level severity becomes a flexible standard: when a
child's impairments are measured against the Listing in order to
determine whether they are of listing-level severity, the ultimate
standard is the new statutory standard for child SSI benefits-
"marked and severe functional limitations"-not the extra-high
"any gainful activity" standard used as the measure of listing-level
severity at Step 3 for adult claims.
205. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 54,756 ("[A]lthough we delinked our policy of functional
equivalence from reference to specific listings, we continue to use the phrase 'functionally
equals the listings,' to underscore that the impairment(s) must be of listing-level severity.").
206. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("The Listing of Im-
pairments describes, for each of the major body systems, impairments which are considered
severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity." (citing 20 C.ER.
§ 404.1525(a) (2001))); Chant v. Bowen, 930 F.2d 633, 635 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The listing
describes impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent an individual from
performing any gainful activity." (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a) and 416.925(a) (1990)).
See also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) ("The Secretary explicitly has set the
medical criteria defining the listed impairments at a higher level of severity than the statu-
tory standard. The listings define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of his
age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just 'substan-
tial gainful activity.'" (citing 20 CFR § 416.925(a) (1989) and Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-19 (1983),
which provides that the Listing defines medical conditions which ordinarily prevent an indi-
vidual from engaging in any gainful activity)). See generally supra text accompanying notes
58-59, 83-86.
207. 20 C.ER. § 416.925(a) (2003).
208. The concept of "listing-level severity" is used confusingly with respect to "meeting"
the requirements of the Listing as well. Thus, the regulations provide, "[I]n general, a
child's impairment(s) is of 'listing-level severity' if it causes marked limitations in two broad
areas of functioning or extreme limitations in one such area" but then goes on to qualify
that statement as follows: "However, when we decide whether your impairment(s) meets the
requirements for any listed impairment, we will decide that your impairment is of 'listing-
level severity' even if it does not result in marked limitations in two broad areas of function-
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This seems to suggest that there are two different standards in
the Listing: "any gainful activity" for adults and "marked and severe
functional limitations" for children. There is, however, no indica-
tion that the Listing was intended to reflect separate levels of
severity for adults and children; indeed, the intention was just the
opposite. The separate rules for applying the Listing to children,
including the application of the child-specific Part B, were in-
tended to cover child disabilities more accurately, not to set a
different level of severity.2° To the extent that the criteria in the
Listing represent a level of severity, they do so at the same level for
adults and children. In reality, therefore, by equating functional
equivalence with "listing-level severity" and "'marked' limitations
in two domains of functioning or an 'extreme' limitation in one
domain" and by equating listing-level severity with the statutory
disability standard for children, the regulations do two things. First,
they set all parts of Step 3, including the new and unique func-
tional equivalence option, at a single level of severity. This point is
reflected in the general definitions regulation discussed above,
which also states, "Marked and severe functional limitations, when used
as a phrase, means the standard of disability in the Social Security
Act for children claiming SSI benefits based on disability. It is a
level of severity that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals
the listings."2 10 Second, despite an attempt in the Listing regula-
tions to say otherwise, they at least suggest that "marked and severe
functional limitations" is the same as the "inability to engage in any
gainful activity."
Why does all this confusion matter? So what if all parts of
Step 3 in the child SSI sequential evaluation process-meeting
a listing, medically equaling the requirements of a listing, and
ing, or extreme limitations in one such area, if the listing that we apply does not require
such limitations to establish that an impairment(s) is disabling." 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b) (2)
(2003). If that is the case, what is the measure for "listing-level severity" when functional
equivalence is being measured against an impairment that does not require marked or ex-
treme limitations? The lack of consistency between the listings in the Listing and the level of
severity announced under the new standard has itself been a source of controversy. See U.S.
GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME: SSA NEEDS A UNIFORM
STANDARD FOR ASSESSING CHILDHOOD DISABILITY, GAO/HEHS-98-123 (May 1998).
209. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. at 532 ("When the Secretary developed the child-
disability listings, he set their medical criteria at the same level of severity as that of the adult
listings." (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 14,705 (1977) (the child-disability listings describe impair-
ments "of 'comparable severity' to the adult listing") and SSA Disability Insurance Letter
(FN12) No. 111-11 (Jan. 9, 1974), App. 97 (child-disability listings describe impairments that
affect children "to the same extent as ... the impairments listed in the adult criteria" affect
adults' ability to work)).
210. 20 C.F.R. § 416.902 (2003).
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functionally equaling the severity of the Listings-require a showing
of "listing-level severity" (read: "inability to engage in any gainful
activity")? After all, there are pages and pages of additional
provisions in the regulations that explain, often by specific
example, how the new functional equivalence option for children
can be proven. But despite the impressive detail in the regulations,
many of the required findings require a subjective assessment. Not
all claims are supported by standardized tests with results that can
be transformed into standard deviations.2 1 ' Not all claims fit the
detailed definitions and examples of "extreme" and "marked"
limitations in the regulations. 12
By framing the disability determination process in classic three-
step sequential evaluation terms, the more difficult and subjective
child SSI disability assessments for children are likely to become
three-step-bound. As a result, the frame of reference for those
claims will be the most demanding, listing-level severity standard
that is associated-correctly, with respect to the five-step sequential
evaluation process-with Step 3: the inability to engage in any
gainful activity. While we may not know exactly what Congress
meant when it set the disability standard for children at "marked
211. Thus, adjudicators are to "consider all the relevant information in your case record
that helps ... determine [the child's] functioning," including descriptions of the child's
functioning from her or his parents, teachers, "and other people who know [the child]." 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(1)(i) (2003). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(1)(ii) (2003) ("The
medical evidence may include formal testing .... Standard scores ... can be converted to
standard deviations. When you have such scores, we will consider them together with the
information we have about your functioning to determine whether you have 'marked' or
'extreme' limitation in a domain" (emphasis added)). Even when test scores are available,
they are not the final word. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(a)(1)(ii) (2003) ("We consider all of the
relevant information in your case record and will not consider any single piece in isolation.
Therefore, we will not rely on test scores alone when we decide whether you are disabled.");
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(4)(i) (2003) (same, with respect to functional equivalence: "No
single piece of information taken in isolation can establish whether you have a 'marked' or
an 'extreme' limitation in a domain.").
212. For this reason, the regulations include some remarkably less-than-specific guid-
ance as well. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2) (i) (2003) ("'Marked' limitation ... means
... 'more than moderate' but 'less than extreme.'"); 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e) (3) (i) (2003)
("'Extreme' limitation ... means a limitation that is 'more than marked.' [It] is the rating
... give[n] to the worst limitations. However, 'extreme limitation' does not necessarily mean
a total lack or loss of ability to function."). As an example of a claim requiring subjective
evaluation, see Bridges v. Massanari, No. CIV.A.00-2639, 2002 WL 202221, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb.
7, 2002) ("The Court finds that while there is evidence of [the claimant's] inattention, hy-
peractivity and impulsiveness, there is nonetheless substantial evidence in the record
supporting the ALJ's conclusion that these did not rise to the level of marked limitations. In
his decision, the ALJ noted that the State Agency Medical Consultants concluded that [the
claimant's] impairments were severe, but did not meet, medically equal or functionally
equal the severity of a listing.").
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and severe functional limitations,, 21 3 surely Congress did not mean
the "inability to engage in any gainful activity."
V. CONCLUSION
Children with disabilities were included in the SSI program
rather casually in 1972 and perhaps that helps explain the Social
Security Administration's rather casual importation of the restric-
tive three-step sequential evaluation process for determining
disability that it was using at the time for dependent spouses to the
new child's SSI program. It took a long and expensive journey-
twenty-five years of pushing and pulling in the courts and in Con-
gress-to free the child's SSI program from a mismatched disability
determination process and to reestablish the program in today's
social legislation climate.1 4 Unfortunately, the Social Security Ad-
ministration implemented the most recent amendments to the
Social Security Act with the familiar three-step sequential evalua-
tion model that remains ill suited to determining disability for
children. In doing so, it has reinforced the notion that traditional
Step 3 constraints-most notably, tying eligibility to listing-level se-
verity-have returned to the child SSI disability determination
process.
It is hard to measure the extent to which a three-step sequential
evaluation mindset reinforces confusion and misunderstanding
surrounding the implementation of the important "functional
equivalence" option in the current child disability regulations. At a
minimum, it seems to have a numbing effect; as noted earlier, most
courts fell quickly into using familiar three-step sequential evalua-
tion language to describe the new disability determination process
for children. Not surprisingly, there are also indications that adju-
dicators are slipping into accepting the use of "listing-level severity"
as a proxy for the statutory disability standard at Step 3, without
distinguishing the current three-step sequential evaluation process
213. Thus, in the context of comparing the current child disability standard with the
pre-1996 version, one court observed, "Without considering more than the statutory lan-
guage, one cannot determine which is more severe: 1.) an 'impairment of comparable
severity' to that which would prevent an adult from engaging in substantial gainful activity;
or 2.) an 'impairment which results in marked and severe functional limitations.'" Haws v.
Apfel, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1278 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
214. For an assessment of the relatively greater need for cash assistance for needy chil-
dren with disabilities as Congress was contemplating its post-ZebLey amendments, see
Restructuring SSI, supra note 156, at 15-19.
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from its predecessors. 2 ' 5 Had the Social Security Administration
constructed the regulatory scheme for child SSI disability determi-
nations from the ground up, this would not have happened. Even
within the sequential evaluation construct, the Administration
could have distinguished the disability determination process for
children and better highlighted the functional equivalence option
by creating a new, post-1996 four-step process rather than a recy-
216cled, pre-Zebley three-step process. 6 Either way, it is time to
abandon the sequential evaluation model for the child's SSI pro-
gram and to free child claimants from the old Step 1, Step 2, Step
3 and you're out.
215. See, e.g., Orben v. Barnhart, 208 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 (D.N.H. 2002) (noting that if
a child's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, an ALJ must "consider
whether the child's impairment is equivalent in severity to that of a listed impairment (i.e.,
whether it 'results in limitations that functionally equal the listings'). In this case, at step
three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ concluded that [the claimant's] impairments did
not meet, and were not medically or functionally equal in severity to, a listed impairment."
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a))); Jefferson v. Barnhart, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1204 (N.D.
Okla. 2002) ("If a child's impairment does not meet or medically equal a Listing, the Com-
missioner's regulations require a consideration of whether the child's impairment is severe
enough that it is functionally equivalent to the severity required by the Listings. Functional
equivalency means that the claimant's impairment is of listing-level severity." (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a)); McCaskill ex rel. Harris v. Massanari, 152 E Supp. 2d 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) ("An impairment meets the severity of a listing if it matches the precise definition in
the listings. An impairment is medically equivalent to a listed impairment if it is 'at least
equal in severity and duration to the listed findings.' ... An impairment is functionally of
'listing-level severity' if it causes marked limitations in two broad areas of functioning or
extreme limitations in one such area.'" (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926(a), 416.925(b) (2))).
See also Mancuso v. Barnhart, No. 02-2088, 2002 WL 31656558, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 2002)
(describing Step 3 as requiring claimants to show "that his or her impairment or combina-
tion of impairments is of 'listing-level' severity, which essentially means that the impairment
meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of an impairment in the Listings
of Impairments").
216. A few courts have interpreted the regulations as setting out a four-step process.
Thus, in Hernandez v. Barnhart, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2002), the court limited
the third step to determining whether a claimant "meet[s] or medically or functionally
equal [s] the requirements listed in the Listing of Impairments" and described the determi-
nation "whether an impairment or a combination of impairments is functionally equivalent
to a listed impairment" as a separate fourth step. A similar idea was expressed by characteriz-
ing medical and functional equivalence as separate steps, after ignoring the traditional first
two steps of a "sequential evaluation." See Hart v. Massanari, 192 F. Supp. 2d 31, 33 (W.D.N.Y.
2001) ("[T]he Commissioner determines whether the child's impairment or combination of
impairments meets, medically equals or functionally equals, in severity any impairment con-
tained in the [Listing of Impairments]. If the impairment or combination of impairments
does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the Commissioner then must deter-
mine whether the child's impairment 'functionally equals' a listed impairment.").
